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1. Introduction 
 
The financial crisis of 2001 witnessed an unprecedented level of corporate accounting 
frauds1 involving some of America’s largest corporations. Executives from Enron, Tyco, 
WorldCom, Global Crossing, Quest, Aldelphia and ImClone were all tried and convicted for 
committing one form of accounting fraud or another. The litany of scandals tore at the ‘soul’ 
of the American economy, and “many loyal workers who had invested in company 401 (k)s, 
pensions, and mutual funds [saw] their life savings wiped out” (Gray, Frieder & Clark, 2005: 
2).  
Seven years later, in 2008, the global financial system was struck by a global financial 
crisis (“GFC”) that changed the financial and economic landscape of the world (Sikka, 
2010a). Immediately after the GFC, a litany of corporate accounting scandals began to make 
headlines. A few examples of these scandals included that of Bernard Madoff‘s (“Madoff”) 
scheme that broke out in 2008.  Madoff was convicted and sentenced to 150 years in prison 
for an elaborate Ponzi scheme in which he swindled investors of over $50 billion (Henriques, 
2009).  There was also the case of a senior Hong Kong executive (and partner) at Ernst & 
Young (“EY”) who, in 2009, was detained for suspected forgery linked to the bankrupt 
electronics maker Akai Holdings Ltd.  EY later entered an out of court settlement in the 
amount of $1 billion for a negligence claim with Akai Holdings Ltd (Ng, 2009). Similarly in 
2009, a London-based accountancy chief from KPMG was sentenced to four years in jail for 
swindling over $900,000 of the firms funds for personal use (Moult, 2009).   
Fast forward to 2014 and there are reports alluding to the continued rise in accounting 
fraud. A Global Economic Crime Survey (“GECS”) conducted by PricewaterhouseCoopers 
(“PWC”) found that accounting fraud is on the rise and poses a serious threat to business 
1
  “Corporate accounting fraud”, “corporate fraud”, and “fraud” will be used interchangeably throughout the 
paper.  Given the nature of the paper, it was not necessary to disentangle the terms since all of three were central 
components of the research methodology undertaken (also see Lynch, McGurrin & Fenwick, 2004: 397). 
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(PWC, 2014). The GECS noted that unless fraud control and prevention measures are 
implemented, businesses will be at greater risk of irreparable damage from fraud.  
While the exact statistics are not known, it is estimated that the number of fraud 
examiners and auditors trained to detect fraud has exploded since the GFC. The Association 
of Certified Fraud Examiners (“ACFE”), arguably the world’s largest anti-fraud organisation 
and premier provider of anti-fraud training and education, now has over 70,000 members 
worldwide. To investigate accounting chicanery and other frauds, the ACFE advocates that 
auditors and other anti-fraud professionals use the fraud triangle as a standard investigative 
method to understand the factors that cause people to commit fraud.  
The fraud triangle's decomposition has its origin in Cressey’s (1953) book, Other 
People’s Money: A Study in the Social Psychology of Embezzlement. Cressey’s (1953) fraud 
triangle consists of three elements: pressure, opportunity and rationalisation, all of which 
must be present in order for a crime to be committed (Cressey, 1953: 30). Support for the 
fraud triangle comes from audit professionals and standard setters who argue that 
investigators analysing financial statements will be able to quantify the pressure (as in 
inflated revenue or overstated net income) that led to the fraud. They will also need to assess 
the opportunity to commit the fraud with reference to weak or absent adequate internal 
controls and the rationalisation techniques used to justify the fraud (see Auditing Standards 
Board, 2002; AICPA, 2002 emphasis added).  
Concerned about the erosion of ethical standards within the accounting profession, the 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (“AICPA”) in 2002 and the International 
Federation of Accountants (“IFAC”) in 2006 , followed the ACFE’s footsteps and turned to 
Cressey’s (1953) work on the fraud triangle for potential explanations of the frauds 
(O’Connell, 2004: 733-784; Donegan & Ganon, 2008: 3).  The adoption of the fraud triangle 
is most evident in the Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 99: Consideration of Fraud 
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in a Financial Statement Audit, which makes the concept the standard method for 
understanding fraudulent conduct (Auditing Standards Board, 2002). 
Despite the efforts of the AICPA and the ACFE, it would appear that the present state 
of fraud prevention is one of abject failure (Sikka, 2010a; Neu, Everett, & Rahaman, 2013; 
Free & Murphy, 2013; Cooper, Dacin & Palmer, 2013; Morales, Gendron & Guénin-
Paracini, 2014). Fraud continues to be a problem to the point where the standard setters do 
not have anything convincing to say about fraud prevention and prescribe policies to put in 
place to reduce fraud (McBarnet, 2006; Dorn, 2010; Power, 2013; PWC, 2014).   
In this paper, I explore the claim of the fraud triangle as a useful framework to combat 
fraud. Using evidence from three cases, I argue that the fraud triangle is not an adequate tool 
for detecting fraud. In particular, I use Fairclough’s (1992, 1995a, & 2003) version of critical 
discourse analysis ("CDA") as a theoretical anchor and argue that the fraud triangle endorses 
a body of knowledge that lacks the objective criteria required to adequately address every 
occurrence of fraud. One key emphasis is the body of knowledge endorsed by the ACFE that 
associates fraud with moral issues (Morales et al., 2014: 177; also see Albrecht & Albrecht, 
2004: 5).  The ACFE's discourse conceptualises fraud as a dishonest act perpetuated by an 
individual for personal enrichment (Wells, 1997: 3-6). By this definition, fraud is rooted in 
the individual's frail morality (not as an effect of wider societal influences), which requires 
surveillance efforts to be geared towards individual ethics by the organisation (Morales et al., 
2014: 177).  
1.1. Why CDA? 
This paper illustrates a critical approach to the analysis of fraud discourse in the form 
of CDA. The systematic exploration of the often opaque relationship of causality between 
discursive and sociocultural practices gives CDA a critical edge in the study of fraud 
discourse, especially as it builds on the premise that discursive practices are constitutive of 
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and are constituted by wider societal practices (Hussein, 2008: 132). An analysis anchored 
within the interface of CDA allows researchers to uncover opaqueness and power 
relationships embedded in fraud discourse (see Fairclough, 1995a: 132-133).  In this sense, 
the use of CDA allows me to utilise a wide range of sources to analyse the ACFE’s discourse 
on fraud more systematically and in more detail from a linguistic perspective (see Fairclough, 
Graham, Lemke, & Wodak, 2004: 3).  Focusing on the dialectic relationship between the 
ACFE’s narrative and its audience,  CDA addresses how the content and the linguistic 
features of discourse influence and are in turn influenced by the contexts of discourse 
production, distribution, reception and adaptation, as well as the wider anti-fraud context in 
which the discourses are embedded (Merkl-Davies & Koller, 2012: 180).   
A CDA’s framework views language as an “interactive process of meaning-making” 
(Fairclough, 2003: 10) through which the discourse disseminated is used to exert power and 
dominance in the anti-fraud market (see also Van Dijk, 1993: 249). Taken together, CDA 
provides a framework that can be used to study texts and discourses on fraud disseminated by 
the ACFE and identify connections between them (Cortese, Irvine, & Kaidonis, 2010). A 
CDA’s framing facilitates a critical understanding of a particular discursive process of the 
acts that come to be seen as fraud and the control measures advocated to minimise their 
occurrences (see Braithwaite & Fisse, 1987: 221; Friedrichs, 1996: xvii; Power, 2013), rather 
than just searching for information for the sake of it (Cortese et al., 2010: 79). By anchoring 
the analysis through a CDA framework that specifically searches for connecting 
relationships, the potential to expose the distorted dialogue in which fraud is represented and 
evaluated becomes much greater (Merkl-Davies & Koller, 2012: 181).  
 
The application of CDA centres on the argument that the fraud triangle represents a 
framework determining the causes of fraud to be rooted in individual behaviour (Cooper et 
al., 2013: 440; Morales et al., 2014: 171).  Analytically, this discourse confirms that the 
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consciousness of wrongdoing is an objective phenomenon and that there is a universal 
consensus on what constitutes fraud (Cooper et al., 2013:  440). Particular attention is given 
to the discourse in which ‘fraud’ is conceptualised in the audit and accounting literature, 
especially mis-statements resulting from fraudulent financial reporting (i.e. frauds involving 
the manipulation of records and accounts) and mis-statements resulting from 
misappropriation of assets (i.e. frauds involving theft, misappropriation or embezzlement) 
(Matthews, 2005: 520) with the antecedents’ prevention efforts accompanying  this definition 
(Donegan & Ganon, 2008;  Cooper et al., 2013; Morales et al., 2014; Power, 2014). The 
objective here is to address this limited perspective and disentangle the dominant discourse 
promoted by the ACFE to show that fraud is a multifaceted phenomenon, the contextual 
factors of which may not fit into a particular framework. As such, a claim can be made to the 
effect that the fraud triangle should not be seen as a sufficiently reliable model for antifraud 
professionals to detect, investigate and deter fraud.  
1.2.   Contributions of the Paper  
The paper contributes to the literature’s on-going concern over the use of the fraud 
triangle to detect fraud in three ways (see Dorminey et al., 2012; Cooper et al., 2013; Free & 
Murphy, 2013; Morales et al., 2014).  First, the paper extends the debate on the fraud triangle 
to provide a useful practitioner’s framework for detecting and preventing fraud. Morales et al. 
(2014) adopted a Foucaultian framing to show how a vision of fraud has been constructed 
around the fraud triangle, which was developed in the aftermath of the creation of the fraud 
examination discipline. The present paper adds to this stream of research by anchoring the 
analysis within the CDA’s theoretical framework.  
Second, it draws attention to the pronouncement and actions of two professional 
bodies dedicated to fight fraud: the ACFE and AICPA. These two professional bodies are 
dedicated and actively working to reduce the problem of fraud. It is hence partly for them that 
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an analysis of the fraud triangle is carried out here. This analysis is accomplished by directly 
responding to a number of burgeoning scholarly concerns on the overly-ambitious claim that 
the fraud triangle can act as a foundation for fraud detection and prevention and that it is the 
only valid model for dealing with fraud (Donegan & Gagon, 2008; Cooper et al., 2013; 
Power, 2013; Morales et al., 2014).  As Morales et al. (2014) illustrated, the  fraud triangle is 
often applied within an apolitical, fraud prevention frame and scholars must continue to ask 
questions about its relevance and extent of influence on cases where it may not be applicable 
(Donegan & Gagon, 2008).  
Lastly, as more and more high profile accounting frauds are trumpeted throughout the 
popular press, there has been an increased focus on fraud related research. These include 
cases of fraud and money-laundering (Mitchell, Sikka & Willmott, 1998; Lehman & 
Okcabol, 2005), the role of accountants in the fight against fraud and corruption (Everett, 
Neu, & Rahaman, 2007; Sikka, 2010a; Neu et al., 2013), the role of accountancy firms in tax 
avoidance schemes (Sikka & Hampton, 2005; Sikka, 2010b), the rationalisation techniques 
used to justify fraud (Murphy & Dacin, 2011), the factors that influence accountants to 
commit fraud (Dellaportas, 2013), the role of professional accounting associations in 
reintegrating former members convicted of fraud (Dellaportas, 2014), and  individuals’ 
decision to co-offend in fraud (Free & Murphy, 2013).  The present paper thus contributes to 
this existing stream of research by offering a critical evaluation of the fraud triangle to show 
that the multifaceted and interrelated complexity of fraud makes it difficult to come up with a 
unidirectional causal theory that can explain all occurrences of fraud. In a realistic fashion 
that reflects the concerns highlighted in recent research (Donegon & Gagon, 2008; Cooper et 
al., 2013: Morales et al., 2014), the paper extends the literature on the fraud triangle by 
suggesting that consideration of macro social and economic dimensions are worthy of 
scholarly attention.  
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The rest of the paper proceeds through five sections. In the first section, I survey the 
existing literature on the three legs of the fraud triangle, followed by a brief review of the 
evolution of its variants. This is followed by a review of CDA and a brief discussion on the 
methodology that provides a rationale for the use of the case study approach to explore 
various accounting phenomena. In the third section, I review the latest work on accounting 
fraud, particularly the institutional and wider societal context within which it exists. Section 
four provides a brief overview of CDA and why it is a useful theoretical framework for 
discussing the fraud triangle; here, particular attention is given to the importance of discourse 
in deconstructing and exposing a number of key limitations the fraud triangle has. Section 
five concludes with a discussion of the implications of the analysis for the future of fraud 
research and scholarship. 
2. The Literature on the Fraud Triangle 
2.1. Pressure to Commit Occupational Fraud  
Cressey (1953) hypothesised that individuals commit fraud because of non-sharable 
financial pressure. Non-shareable financial pressure is a financial strain experienced by an 
individual, which he or she does not intend to share with others. The individual’s inability to 
communicate the financial strain serves as a motivation to transgress the law in order to solve 
the problem. The literature on the pressure to commit occupational fraud can be broadly 
classified into financial pressures and non-financial pressures (AIC & PwC, 2003; 
Fitzsimons, 2009; Albrecht et al., 2012). Non-financial pressures can be further categorized 
as (1) work-related pressure (Hollinger & Clark, 1983; Baucus, 1994; Holton, 2009; Peterson 
& Gibson, 2003; Bartlett et al., 2004); (2) pressure associated with gambling and drug 
addiction (Sakurai & Smith, 2003; Howe & Malgwi, 2006; Kelly & Hartley, 2010); and (3) 
pressure associated with individuals who want to make a statement by living luxurious 
lifestyles (Rezaee, 2005; Dellaportas, 2013; Neu, Everett & Rahaman, 2013).   
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Monetary success, if we understand this as the impressive acquisition of millions 
through personal accomplishment, is responsible for generating strong pressures to succeed in 
a narrowly defined way and to pursue such success by ‘any means necessary’ including fraud 
(Choo & Tan, 2007: 209). A financial strain, such as a distressed business or failed market 
investment(s) is the catalyst that drives many offenders to commit fraud (Dellaportas, 2013: 
30). In an organisational context, financial pressures stem from the company’s failure to meet 
Wall Street’s expectations (Sikka & Hampton, 2005; Dorn, 2010; Sikka, 2010a; Power, 
2013). In other cases, financial pressure arises from the company’s inability to compete with 
other companies in similar industries (Albrecht, Albrecht, & Albrecht, 2004; Sikka & 
Hampton, 2005). Within these purviews, monetary incentives in the form of compensation 
bonuses are given to executives to improve the company’s financial performance (Brennan & 
McGrath, 2007). Financial incentives, coupled with the company’s interest in investors’ 
relations (i.e. to keep stock price high and maintain investors’ confidence), serve as added 
incentives for executives to manipulate financial statements (Mardjono, 2005).  
Work-related non-financial pressures that motivate fraud include workers’ 
dissatisfaction and perceived inequities in the workplace (Hollinger & Clark 1983; AIC & 
PwC, 2003). Hollinger and Clark (1983) chronicled work-related pressures associated with 
fraud, noting that employees’ dissatisfaction is one of  the main indicators in  predicting 
fraudulent behaviour in an organisation. In other studies, employees turn to fraud because of 
perceived inequities in the work-place (Bartlett et al., 2004). Unfair treatment related to 
promotion, remuneration and a lack of appreciation were all cited as reasons for workers to 
commit fraud (Pp. 60-65).  These workers have little respect for the organisation they work 
for and usually see fraud as an act of revenge against their employers (Baucus, 1994).  
Vices such as gambling and drugs represent another category of pressures that 
motivate fraud (Dellaportas, 2013: 30).  Easy access to online gambling including poker and 
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gaming machines, casinos and lotto-style games has contributed to a substantial growth in the 
gambling industry (Sakurai & Smith, 2003; Howe & Malgwi, 2006; Kelly & Hartley, 2010). 
These increased opportunities serve as motivation for fraudsters to steal money and other 
assets in order to satisfy their chronic dependence on gambling (ACFE, 2012). Recent studies 
have shown that the vast majority of offenders, whose primary motivation for fraud is 
gambling, usually plough back their proceeds on gambling itself (Hing, 2002; Sakurai & 
Smith, 2003).  
The offenders’ desire for material possessions creates pressure for them to live like 
their more affluent counterparts (Dellaportas, 2013; Neu, Everett & Rahaman, 2013). The 
type of pressure experienced by offenders in this category varies by their individual 
circumstances (Duffield & Grabosky, 2001; Peterson & Gibson, 2003; Morales et al., 2014). 
Many of these offenders have “egocentric motivations and a desire to possess more than one 
can afford, colloquially referred to as ‘keeping up with the Jones’” (Dellaportas, 2013: 31). 
Egocentric motivations serve as an incentive to the fraudster and are said to be “any pressures 
to fraudulently enhance personal prestige” (Rezaee, 2005: 283). This type of motive is 
usually “seen in those people with very aggressive behaviour and desire to achieve higher 
functional authority in the corporation” (p. 283). Offenders in this category are extremely 
ambitious and are obsessed with power and control; personality traits that make them more 
likely to engage in risky behaviour that could lead to fraud (Dellaportas, 2013: 31).  
2.2. Opportunity to Commit Occupational Fraud  
The opportunity to commit fraud is the next component of Cressey’s (1953) fraud 
triangle. A perceived opportunity to commit a fraudulent act arises when someone in a 
position of trust violates that trust to address a non-sharable financial pressure (Cressey, 
1953: 30). In the accounting literature, opportunity has been examined within the context of 
weak internal controls which, according to KPMG (KPMG, 2006, 2008, 2010), is a major 
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factor attributable to fraud (Albrecht & Albrecht, 2004; Alleyne & Howard, 2005; Rae & 
Subramaniam, 2008; Fleak, Harrison, & Turner, 2010; Kelly & Hartley, 2010; Strand 
Norman, Rose & Rose, 2010: Dellaportas, 2013). Such an opportunity arises when the 
individual has the technical skills and knowledge of “assets, people, information, and 
computer systems that enables him or her not only to commit the fraud but to conceal it” 
(Coenen, 2008; 12). Indeed, the opportunity to engage in fraud increases as the firm’s control 
structure weakens, its corporate governance becomes less effective, and the quality of its 
audit functions deteriorates (Rezaee, 2005; Free, Macintosh & Stein, 2007; Neu, Everett & 
Rahaman, 2013; Power, 2013).  
 Others look to the criminology literature for explanation of the opportunity to commit 
fraud (Colvin, Cullen & Ven, 2002; Donegan & Dagon, 2008; Benson & Simpson, 2009). 
Colvin et al. (2002) argued that coercion and social support are necessary conditions for 
criminal behaviour. Individuals, who are denied access to social support from legitimate 
sources, may seek social support from illegitimate sources (p. 25). In the absence of social 
support, individuals who learn “to manipulate others in efforts to gain social support and in 
the process develop an intermediately intense, calculative social bond, will be more likely to 
approach a criminal opportunity with a calculating spirit” (p. 31). Donegan and Danon (2008) 
build upon the work of Colvin et al. (2002) and examine opportunity from the perspective of 
sub-cultural deviance. Donegan and Danon (2008) argued that the opportunity to commit 
fraud comes from a sub-culture, which through its practices either sends a message to support 
or inhibit fraudulent conduct.   
2.3. The Rationalisation of Occupational Fraud 
Rationalisation is the lack of feelings and indifference expressed by offenders to 
justify any guilt arising from their misconduct (Dellaportas, 2013: 32).  It is a mechanism by 
which  
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an employee determines that the fraudulent behaviour is ‘‘okay’’ in her or his mind. For 
those with deficient moral codes, the process of rationalization is easy. For those with 
higher moral standards, it may not be quite so easy; they may have to convince 
themselves that a fraud is okay by creating ‘‘excuses’’ in their minds (Coenen, 2008: 
12).  
 
The social psychology and criminology literature both provide a great deal of help in 
understanding rationalisation. The criminologists Sykes and Matza (1970), in their work on 
neutralisation theory, argued that criminals normally use ‘the techniques of neutralisation’ to 
rationalise their acts. Neutralisation techniques are often employed to shield the individual 
from his or her own internal values surrounding the existence of guilt (Sykes & Matza, 1970:  
669). The psychological process of sanitising one's conscience was expanded upon more 
recently by Murphy and Dacin (2011). Building on the work of Bandura (1999) (theory of 
moral disengagement) and Festinger (1957) (cognitive dissonance theory), Murphy and 
Dacin (2011) found three psychological pathways to fraud nestled within 
attitude/rationalisation: (1) lack of awareness, (2) intuition coupled with rationalisation, and 
(3) reasoning – the perceived benefits outweigh the costs. The authors used their framework 
to explain how fraud becomes normalised within an organisation and is consistent with the 
works of Ashforth and Anand (2003), Lehman and Okcabol (2005), den Nieuwenboer and 
Kaptein (2008), Rae and Subramaniam (2008), and Ball (2009) on how executives rationalise 
their criminal acts because they see it as a necessary part of their job.  
Rationalisation also involves the fraudster reconciling his/her actions with commonly 
accepted principles of decency and trust. Self-serving and “morally acceptable rationalization 
is necessary before the crime takes place” (Dorminey et al., 2010: 19). Perhaps this is because 
a fraudster who “does not view him/herself as a criminal, he/she must justify his/her 
misdeeds to him/herself before he/she ever commits them” (p. 19). Brytting et al. (2011) 
provide examples of common rationalisation employed by fraudsters to justify their illegal 
behaviour: “everyone is doing it; it’s only fair; I’ve (they’ve) no choice; it’s just a loan; no 
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one is hurt; I’ve (they’ve) earned it; they deserve it; it’s not a crime; they don’t mind; it’s for 
a good cause” (p. 57). Similarly, for corporate executives, the rationalisation to commit fraud 
may include thoughts such as: “we need to keep the stock price high,” “all companies use 
aggressive accounting practices,” “it is for the good of the company,” or “the problem is 
temporary and will be offset by future positive results” (Albrecht et al., 2004: 118). These 
cognitive defence mechanisms are developed to justify and perhaps even valorise 
occupational fraud. Together, they allow the perpetrator to view illegal behaviour as 
acceptable and consistent with his or her personal code of ethics (Ashforth & Anand, 2003; 
Albrecht, 2003; Dedoulis, 2006; Cohen et al., 2010; Neu, Everett, & Rahaman, 2013; 
Morales et al., 2014).  
The present discussion on the elements of the fraud triangle is structured around 
research that assume fraud is committed by dishonest individuals lacking morals and it is the 
duty of the organisation to establish credible layers of controls to prevent their employees 
from committing fraud or at least to detect fraud in a timely manner (see Morales et al., 2013: 
184). Other variants used different articulations to increase the explanatory potential of the 
fraud triangle as a modern fraud diagnostic tool (see Albrecht, Howe & Romney, 1984; 
Rezaee, 2002, 2005; Wolfe & Hermanson, 2004; Choo & Tan, 2007; Ramamoorti, Morrison 
& Koletar, 2009; Krancher, Riley & Wells, 2010). Albrecht et al. (1984) introduced the Fraud 
Scale Model, which suggests that the likelihood of fraud occurring can be assessed by 
examining the relative forces of pressure, opportunity and personal integrity. Rezaee (2002) 
provided an alternative referred to as the “3-C” model and consists of three components 
necessary to commit corporate fraud:  “Conditions”, “Corporate structure”, and “Choice”. 
Wolfe and Hermanson (2004) proposed a fourth dimension, “capability”, to the fraud triangle 
and in so doing, transformed it into a “Fraud Diamond”.  
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Others prefer to combine the fraud triangle with psychology, sociology and 
criminology theories. Choo and Tan (2007) explain corporate fraud by relating the fraud 
triangle to Messner and Rosenfeld’s (1994) work on the American Dream Theory (“ADT”) 
of crime. Ramamoorti et al. (2009) introduced the Bad Apple, Bad Bushel, or Bad Crop 
Syndrome, the so-called ABCs of fraud, to understand the incidence of fraud from an 
individual, group, and macro-oriented contextual perspective. In addition, Krancher et al’s., 
(2010) M-I-C-E (Money, Ideology, Coercion, and Ego/Entitlement) model modifies the 
pressure side of the fraud triangle, by providing an expanded set of motivations beyond a 
non-shareable financial pressure to commit fraud.  
These variants each attempted to respond to the perceived limitations of the fraud 
triangle by including the sociological, psychological and situational factors that affect 
behaviour. The influence of these interrelated complexities has made it difficult for 
researchers to come up with a unidirectional causal theory of crime (Coleman, 1985; Mitchell 
et al., 1998). As a result of the lack of consensus in the literature regarding the causes of 
fraud, there is no reason to believe that the fraud triangle or any existing model can explain 
the majority of corporate frauds (Coleman, 1985; Colvin et al., 2002; Donegan & Ganon, 
2008; Benson & Simpson, 2009; Berger, 2011). The eclectic nature of fraud does not lend 
itself to such an explanation. Consequently, if we are to accept that there is no unified 
conceptual framework to explain the causes of fraud, the fraud triangle as adopted by the 
ACFE, AICPA and the auditing profession cannot be seen as the only valid model to explain 
every occurrence of fraud. These different articulations create a space for a critical analysis of 
a mediated discourse on the fraud triangle (Cooper et al., 2013; Power, 2013). Before turning 
to the analysis of the main theoretical and conceptual tools that have been used by the ACFE 
to explain and understand the processes and reproduction of the branch of knowledge that has 
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come to represent the fraud triangle, I will first look at the theoretical approach that has been 
used to anchor this paper: CDA and the use of discourse.  
3.  Critical Discourse Analysis as a Theoretical Framework 
 Fairclough's (1992, 1995a, 2003, 2010) post-structuralist critical discourse analysis is 
a theoretical approach that focuses on the ways in which knowledge, subjects and power 
relations are produced, reproduced and transformed within discourse (Leitch & Palmer, 2010: 
1195).  In particular, CDA “sets out to capture the dynamic relationships between discourse 
and society, between the micro-politics of everyday texts and the macro-political landscape 
of ideological forces and power relations" (Luke: 2002: 100). Languages, whether written or 
spoken, are the “key raw materials out of which specific discourses, understood as bounded 
ways of representing the world, get shaped” (Fairclough, 2003:  2). CDA is particularly 
critical on how knowledge is maintained and legitimised through discourse (van Dijk, 1993, 
Fairclough & Wodak, 1997; Waller, 2006; Tupper, 2008; Chouliaraki & Fairclough; 2010). 
Discourse not only has pragmatic functions of persuasion and credibility enhancement but 
also socio-political functions of legitimisation and control (Maneri & ter Wal, 2005). As 
Fairclough puts it, discourse is a means of "not just representing the world, but of signifying 
the world, constituting and constructing the world in meaning" (1992: 64). Within this 
definition, the primary institutions of society - education, government and economy as 
interrelated systems - are largely immersed in the dissemination of discourses (Waller, 2006; 
Tupper, 2008; Chouliaraki & Fairclough; 2010: 1214).   
3.1. Fairclough’s Framework for Analysing Discursive Events 
 Fairclough’s (1992) framework is a text oriented form of discourse that links three 
analytical forces when interpreting a communicative event: text, discourse practice and social 
practice. As can be seen in Figure 1of Fairclough’s (1995b) CDA framework, text represents  
written/spoken language such as a news report/speech;  discourse practice represents the 
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process of producing, interpreting, and consuming the news report/speech; and sociocultural 
practice represents the “social and cultural structures which give rise to the communicative 
event of reportage” (Fairclough, 1995b: 57 emphasis added). The combined effect of these 
dimensions results in the dissemination of ideology and power, which is then converted into 
social practice.  
3.1.1. Text: Micro-Level Analysis 
According to Fairclough (1995b), the analysis of text is a significant part of social 
scientific analysis and involves a linguistic deconstruction of vocabulary, grammar and 
semantics above the sentence level (p. 57). Linguistic analysis is informative for 
understanding the structural implications in the construction of language and the micro-level 
properties of text (Fairclough, 1995a). Fairclough noted that a linguistic-discursive analysis 
of texts is concerned with a critical awareness of what is present and absent in texts, which 
could include “representations, categories of participant, and constructions of participant 
identity or participant relations" (Fairclough, 1995b: 58; see also Fairclough et al., 2004; 
Fairclough, 2010). 
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Figure 1: Fairclough’s Dimensions of Critical Discourse Analysis (Fairclough, 
1995a: 59). 
 
3.1.2. Discourse Practice: Linking the sociocultural and textual 
Discourse practice is the mediating dimension that links text to the broader social 
context of its production (Fairclough, 1995b: 59-60). The analysis of discourse practice 
involves “various aspects of the process of text production and text consumption” (p. 58). 
Fairclough went on to argue that discourse practice has two dimensions: institutional 
processes and discourse processes (pp. 58-59); institutional processes refer to “institutional 
routines such as editorial procedures involved in producing media text” (pp. 58-59), whereas 
discourse processes refer “to the transformation which texts undergo in production and 
consumption” (pp. 58-59). When put into context, “discourse practice straddles the division 
between society and culture on the one hand, and discourse, language and text on the other" 
(p. 60). 
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3.1.3. Sociocultural Practice: Macro-Level Analysis 
According to Fairclough (1995b), social practice is to be understood in terms of the 
context of the situation (i.e., institution and societal) that gives structure and meaning to 
discourse (Fairclough, 2010). The analysis focuses on the wider social practice to which the 
discursive content belongs. Fairclough’s analysis of this dimension gives relevance to three 
facets of the sociocultural context of discourse:  economic (i.e. economy of the media), 
political (i.e. power and ideological dominance), and cultural (i.e. hegemonic cultural 
practices) (Fairclough, 1995b: 62).  
 3.2. CDA and Fraud  
  Comparatively little in-depth research has been conducted on CDA and fraud 
(Machin & Mayr, 2012: 63). Drawing from the work done on fraud prevention, mostly in the 
accounting and audit literature, this paper takes a small step towards addressing this gap. 
Discourse on fraud prevention and, in particular, the discursive construction of management 
fraud (i.e., material misstatements resulting from fraudulent financial reporting) reflects both 
complementary and contested ideological positions (see Tupper, 2008; Matthews, 2005; 
Machin & Mayr, 2012). Generally, the term ‘ideology’ may be understood to represent 
"complex ways in which meaning is mobilized for the maintenance of relations and 
domination” (Thompson, 1990: 8; see also van Dijk, 1993), while a more attenuated 
construction of the concept of ideology draws “our attention to the ways in which meaning is 
mobilized in the service of dominant individuals and groups” (Thompson, 1990: 73). The 
construction and dissemination of formal fraud discourse is one way in which professional 
associations responsible for perpetuating ideologies serve their own self-interests (Miller, 
Karunmäki, & O’Leary, 2008): 
 
[the] analysis of fraud and wrongdoing involves the shaping of definitions and 
constructions of reality and what is seen as immoral, wrong or illegal. It is 
closely linked to the global spread of ideology and discourses that define some 
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practices as fraudulent, others as immoral, others as tradition, and yet others as 
innovative (Cooper et al., 2013:446). 
 
From this perspective, the  dominant fraud prevention framework (i.e., the fraud triangle) is 
an ideology that represents the interests of the authorities (in this case the ACFE) in 
explaining, detecting and preventing fraud (see Donegan & Ganon, 2008;  Cooper et al., 
2013; Morales et al., 2014). Accordingly, the spread of fraud prevention discourse 
conceptualised through a specific vision gains legitimacy and may work to suppress efforts 
and limit options for change. However, as illustrated by Morales et al. (2014), much of the 
peculiar discourse on what fraud is, what its causes are and who is responsible for controlling 
it can be disentangled with careful attention to the text that reproduces it (e.g., see Tupper, 
2008; Miller et al., 2008).  
As an example, Morales et al. (2014) adopted Foucaultian writings to frame and 
examine the origins of the fraud triangle. Their framing suggests that the advocates of the 
fraud triangle, implicitly or otherwise, frame the problem in such a way as to impose their 
own chosen solution on ‘the problem’. By framing fraud as a problem that can be addressed 
through increased surveillance of the individual, the work of accountants and auditors is 
made necessary and valuable; consequently, it makes sense that the ACFE uses the fraud 
triangle because the fraud triangle validates its very existence. The theory here, in short, is 
that one's chosen solution(s) actually specify or constitute the very problem that needs to be 
addressed. By using a Foucaultian framing, Morales et al. (2014) were able to provide some 
particularly interesting and provocative insights, leading to some unexpected conclusions on 
the fraud triangle.2 In a similar manner, discourse represents a genre of works used by 
professional anti-fraud and audit associations (ACFE, AICPA, and IFAC) to build a body of 
knowledge that is representative of the fraud triangle (see Cressey, 1953; Wells, 1997).  
2
 I would like to acknowledge one of the anonymous reviewers for this point.  
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Although the discourse representing the fraud triangle is primarily grounded in 
Cressey's (1953) work, this genre also draws upon other acclaimed work in criminology (see 
Sutherland, 1937, 1949; Wells, 1997 as cited in Morales et al., 2014) to identify and analyse 
its components. Discourses are used to represent this dominance, taking the form of overt 
support to promote a particular position while occluding other alternatives outright 
(Fairclough, 1992, 1995a; van Dijk, 1993). It is therefore an important tool for analysing how 
the ideology of the fraud triangle is reproduced through institutional (i.e., the ACFE) and 
professional processes to secure power and hegemony over a particular body of knowledge 
that the ACFE claimed can detect and prevent fraud.  
4. Methodology 
 
4.1. The Case Study Approach 
 
Cooper and Morgan (2008) advocate the case study approach to study accounting 
phenomena. According to Cooper and Morgan (2008), case studies can enhance research and 
help understand complex accounting issues (p. 165). Indeed, many have used the case study 
approach to study issues related to corporate fraud (Mitchell et al., 1998; Mardjono, 2005; 
Choo & Tan, 2007; Donegan & Ganon, 2008; Sikka, 2008; Clikeman, 2009; Mitchell & 
Sikka, 2011; Gabbioneta et al., 2013; Neu et al., 2013). The use of case studies allows these 
researchers to examine real world accounting problems in an intellectually rigorous manner 
(e.g. see Donegan & Ganon, 2008; Neu et al., 2013). A case study methodology facilitates 
holistic investigation and adds strength to the validity of previous research (see Mitchell et 
al., 1998; Sikka, 2008; Mitchell & Sikka, 2011). This epistemological approach allows for 
insights into the inquiry around a contemporary accounting phenomenon within a real-life 
context (Yin, 2003: 13). 
In this paper, I used three illustrative cases to show where and how the fraud triangle 
is inadequate. To give perspective, I used CDA to direct the selection of cases. A CDA 
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framing provides a more solid foundation for both choosing cases and analysing them. As it 
pertains to the present paper, a CDA framing provides a clear justification for deciding which 
cases are important to the study and what to look for in these cases. The critical analysis of 
discourse shows how language is used to identify problems in the social order and how those 
in authority shape societal responses to these problems (Jaworski & Coupland: 1999: 3). 
Likewise, the cases are selected in a way to show how the construction of the (dominant) 
discourses surrounding the fraud triangle privileges events that align with the explanations of 
fraud supplied by the ACFE and professional auditing groups, as well as explanations of the 
persuasive marginalisation of "Other" in terms of the manipulation of detection and 
prevention models that normalise deviance within organisations (Donegan & Ganon, 2008; 
Mitchell & Sikka, 2011; Cooper et al., 2013; Morales et al., 2014). The discourse becomes 
itself more marketable and constitutes a sort of commodity in which its purveyors can market 
themselves through skillful use of strategies that normalise how the fraud triangle evaluates 
fraud (Cooper et al., 2013: 444; also see Jaworski & Coupland, 1999: 5).  
  Two broad themes within CDA guide the case selection process. The first of these is 
influenced by Fairclough & Wodak’s (1997) work on the micro meaning of discourse. Here, 
the cases were selected on the basis of how significant the issues are in terms of the micro-
level of interaction used to promote the fraud triangle. The use of language and 
communication are of paramount importance in the micro-level discourse (Jaworski & 
Coupland, 1999). The second approach draws on van Dijk’s (1993) macro-level methodology 
and focused on the broad rhetorical strategies and central themes used to promote the fraud 
triangle. Power, dominance and the push for control by the ACFE of the anti-fraud market 
belongs to the macro-level of analysis. Eventually, a CDA has to theoretically bridge the gap 
between these two approaches to form a unified whole. For instance, a speech about fraud 
prevention at one of the ACFE’s regional conferences is a discourse at the micro-level of 
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interaction, but at the same time, may be published as a constituent part of the ACFE’s 
examination toolkit and reproduce  on a more macro-level (see Morales et al.,  2014: 172).  
In employing these approaches, the cases were selected to consider ways in which 
certain discourses of normality constitute a specific vision of fraud and how these particular 
discourses fail to capture other elements of behaviour as fraudulent and illegal. The issue at 
the heart of the case studies selected strongly reflects the growing tensions between how the 
ACFE and professional auditing groups frame the events related to fraud and how the broader 
anti-fraud community interpret these events (see Dorminey et al., 2010; Mitchell & Sikka, 
2011; Cooper et al., 2013; Morales et al., 2014). These were cases where the frauds were 
complex and did not involve non-shareable financial pressure; they were the products of 
collusion; and the fraudsters did not need to rationalise their actions. Each case shows how 
the construction of a particular discursive event can work to misrepresent what comes to be 
known as fraud. The selected cases are a function of their relevance in that if the fraud 
triangle does not represent every occurrences of fraud, then it is essential to examine and 
evaluate its application and consequences essentially from the cases point of view. 
 By reading various news outlets and the Securities and Exchange Commission’s 
(“SEC”) Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases, I was able to collate a shortlist of 
cases for which there was sufficient information to carry out a critical analysis of the 
discourses used to promote the fraud triangle. Secondary evidence from newspaper reports 
was also used in the research. The cases involved both individuals working for the corporate 
entity and the corporate entity themselves. This case selection approach will allow for an 
evaluation of the fraud triangle’s concepts from both a solo-offending (individualized) and 
co-offending (collective) perspective in fraud (also see Free & Murphy, 2013). To provide a 
diversity of perspectives and industries, I used cases from a huge multinational retail 
corporation (Walmart), a global financial service firm (Lehman Brothers), and a professional 
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service company (KPMG). The cases represent a general trend and in the case of Lehman, 
precipitated the GFC and triggered a public debate on fraud among global banks in the U.S 
and elsewhere. The detailed examination of these cases represents a class of phenomena and 
provides reliable information that is symptomatic of a much broader problem (see Flyvbjerg, 
2004).  The objective was to select cases that will (1) provide the greatest insights into areas 
where the fraud triangle seems inadequate, and (2) give the greatest possible amount of 
information that will allow for an analysis of the legs of the fraud triangle.  
All of these cases are relatively familiar having received significant media coverage 
since 2002.  Each case contains a brief discussion of the material facts surrounding the fraud, 
and then presents information to highlight the inadequacy of the fraud triangle. While none of 
the cases are perfect examples, they provide enough evidence to allow for a CDA that 
challenges the theoretical underpinnings and practical relevance of the fraud triangle.  The 
cases are dealt with as single units (a relatively bounded accounting phenomenon), where the 
aim is to elucidate features of a larger, more profound set of similar phenomenon that are 
reflective of corporate frauds (Gerring, 2004: 341).   
4.1.1. Case 1: Thomas Coughlin, Walmart Executive 
 
In 1978, Thomas Coughlin, a graduate from the California State University (East 
Bay), began his career in the securities division and eventually became Vice President of 
Loss Prevention at Walmart. Over the years, Coughlin worked his way up to becoming the 
Vice-Chairman, arguably one of the most powerful positions in the organisation. From 1998 
to 1999 he served as the Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer of Walmart 
Stores Division. In 2001, he became a director of ChoicePoint Inc., a data aggregation 
company listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and also a member of Walmart’s 
Board. From 2002 to 2003, Coughlin served as Executive Vice President and President and 
Chief Executive Officer of Wal-Mart Stores Division. In 2003, he became Executive Vice 
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President and Vice Chairman of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (USA). On December 6, 2004, 
Coughlin announced that he would retire from Walmart’s Board in January 2005 after 25 
years with the Company. In March 2005, Walmart announced that Coughlin had resigned his 
seat from Walmart’s Board because of an internal investigation into allegations of fraud and 
deceit. According to a Wall Street Journal’s article, Coughlin 
periodically had subordinates create fake invoices to get Walmart to pay for his 
personal expenses. The questionable activity appears to involve dozens of transactions 
over more than five years, including hunting vacations, a $1,359 pair of alligator boots 
custom-made for Mr. Coughlin and a $2,590 dog pen for Mr. Coughlin’s Arkansas 
home (Bandler & Zimmerman, 2005: para. 4).  
 
The article goes on to note that the total estimate of the fraudulent transactions were between 
$100,000 and $500,000 over three to five years (para. 6). In July of 2005, Walmart turned the 
matter over to the United States Department of Justice. When the charge first surfaced in 
April of 2005, Coughlin claimed that, “the money was spent on anti-union activities such as 
paying people to identify stores where union leaders planned to recruit, according to a source 
familiar with the matter” (Barbaro, 2005: para.1). In January of 2006, Coughlin pleaded 
guilty to five counts of wire fraud and one count of filing false tax returns — all felonies 
committed while serving on Walmart Board. Coughlin avoided prison time but was sentenced 
to 27 months of home detention and five years probation; he was also ordered to pay $50,000 
fines and about $411,000 in restitution to Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (Voris & Boulden, 2006: 
para. 2).  
4.1.2. Case 2: Scott London, KPMG Partner 
 
Scott London, age 50, of Agoura Hills, California, is a certified public accountant 
(“CPA”) who was licensed to practice in the states of California and Nevada. London was 
employed at KPMG from 1984 until his resignation in 2013.  At the time of the offence, he 
was the Partner-in-Charge of Southern California’s regional audit practice and served clients 
in California, Arizona and Nevada. London was also the Lead Audit Engagement Partner on 
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the Herbalife, Ltd. (“Herbalife”) and Skechers USA, Inc. (“Skechers”) engagements. During 
his 2009 to 2011 audit engagement period, London served as the Account Executive for 
footwear designer Deckers Outdoor Corp (“Deckers”).  
Due to his position at KPMG, London had access to material non-public information 
about many of the firm’s clients (Securities and Exchange Commission v. Scott London et al, 
2013). On at least 18 occasions between October 2010 and February 2013, Scott London, the 
former partner of KPMG, was charged with criminal insider trading for disclosing the 
material non-public information of five audit clients to a friend, Bryan Shaw, who traded in 
the companies’ securities prior to their corporate announcements. It is estimated that Shaw 
used the information to make $1.27 million in illegal trading profits (Pfeifer, Hamilton & 
Chang, 2013; Securities and Exchange Commission v. Scott London et al, 2013). The clients 
affected by London’s auditor independence rule violations were Herballife, Skecher, 
Deckers, RSC Holdings, Inc., and Pacific Capital Bancorp. London’s friend in turn rewarded 
him with $50,000 in cash and $70,000 in kickbacks for the information (Wells, 2013: para. 
6). London pleaded guilty to insider trading and faces up to 20 years in federal prison. In 
April of 2014, London was sentenced to 14 months in prison and ordered to pay a $100,000 
fine. 
4.1.3. Case 3: Lehman Brothers 
 
Lehman Brothers (“Lehman”) was founded in 1850 by German immigrants Henry 
Lehman and his brothers, Emanuel and Mayer. While Lehman prospered over the intervening 
decades, it had to endure many challenges: the Great Depressions of the 1930s, two World 
Wars, and the Russian debt default of 1998, amongst others. However, despite Lehman’s 
ability to withstand these challenges, the subprime mortgage crisis brought the once largest 
investment bank hurling headlong to the ground.  
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Lehman’s troubles started with its decision to enter the real estate business in 
2003during the U.S. housing bubble. At first, this decision under their Chief Executive 
Officer (“CEO “) Richard Fuld seems credible. Record growth from Lehman’s real estate 
business enabled revenues in the capital markets unit to surge to 56% between 2004 and 
2006. In 2006, the Company securitised $156 billion of mortgages, which represented a 10% 
increase from 2005. For the full 2007 fiscal year, Lehman reported a record net income of 
$4.2 billion on revenues of $19.3 billion (from $17.6 billion for the 2006 fiscal year).  
In 2007, cracks began to surface in the U.S. housing markets with an increasing 
number of defaults. Lehman started to suffer losses and resorted to illegal techniques to mask 
its loss. To hide its unhealthy financial position, Lehman resorted to a window dressing 
technique called Repurchase Agreement (Repo 105) (Jeffers, 2011). Repo has historically 
been used to allow companies to manage their short-term cash, but “in Lehman’s case, these 
transactions took on an unusual spin that were designed to make Lehman’s balance sheet 
appear to look healthier than they actually were” (p. 46). Repo 105 allowed Lehman to used 
arcane accounting techniques to sell toxic assets to banks in Cayman Islands with the 
understanding that they would eventually be bought back. With the help of its auditors, this 
accounting manoeuvre was engineered to allow Lehman to create an impression that it had 
$50 billion more in cash and $50 billion less in toxic assets on its books and artificially 
reduce its net debt level (Valukas, 2010: 42).  It was no surprise therefore that Lehman 
declared bankruptcy with $615 billion in debt.  
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Table 1-1: Summary of the Cases 
Facts Thomas Coughlin, Walmart Executive 
Company Type A retail corporation 
Fraud Type Misappropriated funds from Walmart between $100,000 and $500,000 
Main Players Thomas Coughlin 
How He Did It Created fake invoice to get Walmart to pay for his expenses 
How He Got Caught Investigation by the FBI and U.S. Department of Justice 
Penalties 5 years probation; 27 months home detention; pay $50,000 fine and $411,000 in 
restitution to Walmart and the Internal Revenue Service 
Facts  Scott London, KPMG Partner 
Company Type Professional accounting firm 
Fraud Type Insider trading 
Main Players Scott London 
How He Did It  Gave confidential information of companies he audited to a friend in exchange for 
cash bribes and luxury items  
How He Got Caught FBI investigation 
Penalties Sentenced to 14 months in Prison; ordered to pay a $100,000 fine  
Facts Lehman Brothers 
Company Type Investment firm 
Fraud Type Hid $50 billion in toxic asset 
Main Players Lehman's executives Richard Fuld, Erin Callan, its accountants, and the 
Company’s auditors, EY 
How They Did It Sold toxic asset to banks in Cayman Island to create the impression that  Lehman 
had $50billion more in cash 
How They Got Caught Forced into bankruptcy 
Penalties No penalties imposed by SEC because of lack of evidence 
 
5.  The Role of Discourse in Conceptualising “Fraud” 
Fraud categorised as “white-collar crime” has been the focus of a great deal of 
research in criminology and sociology (Power, 2013: 526; Cooper et al., 2013: 441; Lynch, 
McGurrin, & Fenwick, 2004: 390-391). To understand how the term ‘fraud’ has been 
conceptualised in the literature, it is necessary to begin with historical work on the definition 
of white-collar crime. Ever since Sutherland (1949) coined the term ‘white-collar crime’, the 
definitional problem of what constitutes “fraud” has proven to be an “intellectual nightmare” 
(Geis & Meier, 1977: 25; see also Berger, 2011). Despite the fact that in inaugurating the 
concept Sutherland went to great lengths to define white-collar crime both through 
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elaboration and examples, debate continues as to the proper definition of the term (Coleman, 
1985; Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990; Lynch et al., 2004).  
Central to this debate is the discomfiting picture of crimes committed by people in 
certain respectable occupations (physicians, lawyers, government bureaucrats etc.). In 
Sutherland's view, “white-collar crime may be defined approximately as a crime committed 
by a person of respectability and high social status in the course of his occupation” 
(Sutherland, 1949: 9). A closer look at Sutherland’s definition establishes the individual’s 
status, occupation, and organisational affiliation as central to the definition of white-collar 
crime (Weisburd, Waring & Chayet, 2001: 8). Specifically, Sutherland “associated the term 
‘white-collar crime’ with the individual (business managers and executives) and their 
organizational circumstances” (Croall, 2001: 3; Morales et al., 2014: 174). In distinguishing 
between macro and micro-sociological explanations of crime, Berger suggests that macro-
sociological theories focus on the broader historical, economic and political factors that affect 
organisations whereas micro-sociological theories “focus on the link between individual 
actors and their immediate organizational circumstances” (Berger, 2011: 27). Accordingly, if 
one is to follow Berger’s delineation, Sutherland provides a micro-sociological explanation of 
white-collar crime (Berger, 2011: 35–36; see also Morales et al., 2014: 174).   
Sutherland’s (1937, 1945, and 1949) works had a significant impact on Cressey. In 
addition to Cressey’s (1953) landmark work on embezzlement, he was instrumental in 
continuing the work of Sutherland (see for example Principles of Criminology, Sutherland & 
Cressey, 1966). Cressey (1953) was particularly interested in occupational fraud and the 
circumstances that lead occupational offenders to become ‘trust violators’. In developing the 
three elements of what later became known as the fraud triangle, Cressey (1953) like 
Sutherland (1949) considered fraud to be an individual problem (Morales et al., 2014). This 
observation was made by examining embezzlement (rather than other white-collar crimes) as 
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a crime perpetrated by an individual acting alone for financial gain (Cressey, 1953: 30). In 
this restricted view, Cressey (1953) defined white-collar crime as an act “perpetrated by an 
individual acting alone, motivated by personal gain, and for which he has betrayed a position 
of trust that he had initially accepted in good faith” (Morales et al., 2014: 175). In putting 
forward his definition, it is evident that Cressey’s (1953) focus was “on phenomena located 
within the individual – perceptions, opinions and justifications that one gives to oneself” (p. 
176). The implication therefore is that Cressey (1953) saw the causes of crime as being 
rooted within the individual’s psychology rather than the social environment and, as such, 
provided an individualistic explanation (Berger, 2011: 27 & 30; Morales et al., 2014: 171).  
Until recently, Sutherland’s (1949) micro-sociological approach and Cressey’s (1953) 
individualistic explanations on the etiology of fraud have occupied a prominent place in the 
accounting and audit literature (Albrecht,  Howe, & Romney, 1984; Albrecht et al., 2004; 
Lehman and Okcabol, 2005;  Rezaee, 2007; O’Connell, 2007;  Ramamoorti,  Morrison & 
Koletar, 2009;  Cohen et al., 2010; Jones, 2010;  Razaee  & Riley, 2010;  Sikka, 2010a, 
2010b;  Cooper et al., 2013; Dellaportas, 2013; Free & Murphy, 2013). This explanatory 
attempt has gained ascendency and is built on a construction that sees fraud as being rooted in 
the individual’s frail morality; it invariably takes the character of the apparently deviant 
individual(s) into question (Morales et al., 2014: 177; Power, 2013: 526). Fraud is centred on 
“individual acts of moral deviance” (Morales et al., 2014: 177) and is associated with a 
neurotic personality (Dorminey et al., 2010), a Machiavellian attitude (Murphy, 2012), and an 
industrial psychopath’s deceit for financial gain (Ramamoorti, 2008; Brazel, Jones, & 
Zimbelman, 2009; Murphy & Dacin, 2011; Albrecht et al., 2012; Brody, Melendy & Perri, 
2012). Psychological traits such as dishonesty, greed and self-interest are seen as the main 
motivations for fraud. This dominant perspective of fraud considers it to be an abnormal 
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phenomenon, perpetuated by rational actors who make decisions that are not influenced by 
their situational context (Palmer, 2012).  
5.1. Power Enhancement and Discourse Production in Identifying and Addressing Fraud 
Risk  
Following on from a discursive practice that contextualises ‘fraud’ as being rooted in 
the individual psychology of the fraudster, it is not surprising that the discourse on 
surveillance techniques has enabled fraud prevention to be viewed in more specific ways 
(Cooper et al., 2013: 453; see also AICPA, 2002; Wolfe & Hermanson, 2004; IFAC, 2006; 
Power, 2013; Williams, 2013). The need to establish a micro-sociological perspective on 
fraud has steered prevention efforts towards organisational surveillance of individual ethics 
(Wells, 1997: 3-6; Albrecht & Albrecht, 2004: 5; Dellaportas, 2013: 31-32; Free & Murphy, 
2013: 6; Power, 2013: 526; Morales et al., 2014: 15-16), and has focused fraud prevention 
efforts “on how to impact potential fraudsters’ decisions not to commit fraud” (Cooper et al., 
2013: 443). This method of preventing and detecting fraud has created a new category of risk 
known as fraud risk, which is designed to aid auditors in identifying and acting on signals of 
potential fraud (Strand Norman et al., 2010; Power, 2013). Within this discourse, fraud risk is 
seen as ontologically different from ‘fraud’ as fraud itself is considered to be a disruptive 
event (Power, 2013). Fraud risk is conceptualised in terms of giving "prominence to the 
power of ideas and specific conceptions of individuals, organizations and society" (Cooper et 
al., 2013: 450). Rather than being a matter of common sense and functional necessity, the rise 
of fraud risk management as a functional response to the incidence of fraud is emblematic of 
a distinct liberal project of “individualization and responsibilization” in corporate governance 
discourse (Power, 2013: 526). ‘Fraud risk’ gives prominence to individuals and organisations 
and “is positioned as an object in a wider system of rules for talking about, acting on and 
governing organizations in the name of risk” (p. 526).   
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In other contexts, it is the discourses and practices of regulatory activities that enable 
fraud risk and prevention techniques to be understood in specific ways (Cooper et al., 2013; 
see also Williams, 2013). In his account on securities regulation in Canada, Williams (2013) 
depicted ‘regulatory technology’ in terms of “active agents proactively scanning available 
market data for signs of trouble and then feeding the results to their human counterparts” 
(Williams, 2013: 545). Ultimately, for Williams (2013), the key question is “how technology 
shapes the field, scope, and logics of regulatory engagement producing particular forms of 
disorder to the exclusion of others, all the while constituting ‘finance’ and ‘the market’ itself 
in the process” (p. 545). Williams made references to enforcement gaps and regulatory 
omissions whereby the use of certain technologies creates a specific vision of fraud and, 
inversely, fails to identify other potentially fraudulent problems that are outside their gauge 
(Williams, 2013: 553-555). Existing technology defines events that are labelled as ‘fraud’ and 
‘fraud risk’ because their effectiveness is dependent "on machine readable information and 
have difficulty identifying complex and innovative accounting and financial statement 
frauds" (Cooper et al., 2013: 451). These frauds rarely come to light because they are 
subsumed under "the smooth surface of algorithms and technological outputs… framed in 
terms of the sound principles of technocratic inquiry and disinterested deliberation” 
(Williams, 2013: 555).  
To the extent that regulators are using ‘regulatory technology’ to detect potential 
misconduct, they play a critical role in shaping acts that have come to be seen as fraud and by 
extension the boundaries of enforcement (see Preda, 2009). Of course, the major actors (in 
this case market agents) are no doubt aware of the limits of these ‘regulatory technologies’ 
and have adjusted their practices accordingly (Neu et al., 2013; Braithwaite, 2013). These 
practices have become part of the rules of the game to the extent that they “alter market 
activities and potentially exacerbating existing financial risks” (Williams, 2013: 555). The 
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reality therefore is that, as with most forms of corporate policing, fraud detection and 
prevention are constituted between a vast and decidedly amorphous ‘dark figure of crime’ 
and a series of rather limited detection devices, interpretive capabilities and carrying 
capacities (Williams, 2012: 112). Routine fraud perpetrated by insiders becomes normalised 
and egregious behaviour by outsiders is the focus of prosecution (Cooper et al., 2013:  451). 
The failure of regulatory technologies to detect fraud risk outside of their gaze suggests 
legitimate and orderly financial markets (Preda, 2009). Adopting this subterranean cluster of 
narratives and discourses around fraud prevention “ignores the wider economic and 
institutional context and issues of power, thereby ignoring macro social and economic 
dimensions (such as poverty) and occludes other models and understandings of fraud” 
(Cooper et al., 2013: 444).  
5.2. Unpacking the Institutional and Societal Context of Fraud 
Accounting and auditing research privileges the psychological explanation and 
downplays the socio-political explanations of fraud and fraud risks (Morales et al., 2014: 
176). In so doing, the institutional and social forces nurturing fraud escape scrutiny and, 
consequently, exonerate the social system. The approach taken here is to widen the horizons 
of the research and to draw on diverse disciplines that have addressed the social-
psychological, structural variables and macro-level features of fraud both in organisations and 
in society (see Lynch et al., 2004; Cooper et al., 2013). This interdisciplinary review 
highlights a significant body of work on white-collar crime and recognises that fraud can take 
shape through individual, collective or systemic forms (Cooper et al., 2014). The effort has 
raised different questions and provides new understanding of the term ‘fraud’ (see 
Sutherland, 1949;  Croall, 2001;  Choo & Tan, 2007; Donegan & Ganon, 2008;  Gabbioneta 
et al., 2013; Neu et al., 2013; Williams, 2013; see also Murphy & Dacin, 2011; Murphy 2012; 
Dellaportas, 2014). Fraud has been examined in different substantive areas taking into 
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consideration the various practices and situational contexts in which it occurs (Choo & Tan, 
2007; Donegan & Ganon, 2008; Palmer, 2012; Cooper et al., 2013; Gabbioneta et al., 2013; 
Neu et al., 2013). These different nuances and associations have contextualised fraud as a 
common occurrence perpetrated by rational actors whose behaviours are shaped by their 
social and environmental contexts (Palmer, 2012; Powers, 2013; Morales et al., 2014); if the 
occurrence of fraud is treated as a phenomenon that is socially constructed, it becomes 
apparent that situational and organisational factors must be part of the discourse (see 
Gabbioneta et al., 2013).   
5.2.1.   The Institutional Processes and Practices that Influence Fraud 
 Recent research has described the way in which institutional processes and practices 
influence fraud (Sikka, 2010a, 2010b; Gabbioneta et al., 2013; Neu et al., 2013; Davis & 
Pesch, 2013). Gabbioneta et al. have emphasised “how institutional arrangements can be 
unwitting accomplices to corporate illegality, initially by encouraging its occurrence (through 
the mechanism of institutional endorsement), and then by providing opportunities for its 
concealment (through regulatory loopholes, and the mechanism of institutional ascription)” 
(Gabbioneta et al., 2013: 16 emphasis added). Here, Gabbioneta et al. (2013) highlight the 
limitations of the fraud triangle model (Cooper et al., 2013). Organisations have rules that 
senior officers are expected to follow to achieve organisational goals, however although rules 
are prescribed, evidence abounds that pressure from the top encourages officers to transgress 
these rules in order to meet financial targets (Free et al., 2007; Everett, Neu & Rahaman, 
2007; Cohen et al., 2010; Sikka, 2010b; Free & Murphy, 2013).   
 Sikka's (2010b) work on tax evasion and avoidance is instructional here. He (2010b) 
notes that companies legitimise their social credentials by promising responsible and ethical 
conduct; however, organisational culture and practices are not necessarily aligned with these 
publicly espoused claims (p. 153). His work draws attention to the gap between corporate 
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talk, decisions and action culminating in organised hypocrisy in regard to what corporations 
say and do, particularly as they need external legitimacy whilst internal practices pursue 
profits at almost any cost (p. 165).  The systemic pressure to maximise profits has led 
corporations to develop two distinct cultures: 
one promises ethical conduct to external audiences and this is decoupled from 
the organisational practices which are geared to improving profits by avoiding 
and even evading taxes. In essence, companies have developed elaborate 
practices to appropriate returns due to society on its investment of social 
capital (p. 165).  
 
The two ultimately cannot be reconciled and thus implode (e.g. at Enron, WorldCom, etc.), 
thereby exposing organised hypocrisy.  
Davis and Pesch (2013) used an agent-based model to explore fraud dynamics in 
organisations. Their paper fits within the rational choice decision-making model of fraud and 
examines how bounded actors weigh up their options and choose particular fraud related 
behaviour (Cooper et al., 2013). They also state that in organisations where there are no 
formal rules to combat fraud, the rate of emulation between heterogeneous moral agents 
impacts dramatically upon fraudulent activities in the organisation (pp. 480-481 emphasis 
added). In their model, individual heterogeneous agents, each of whom could have the motive 
and opportunity to commit fraud along with a pro-fraud attitude, interact with each other (p. 
469). The actors operate within a ‘social network’ (a set of co-workers) characterised by its 
own rules, which provides a mechanism for the cultural transmission of a pro-fraud attitude 
(p. 469). Their benchmark model identified two classes of organisations. In organisations 
with low levels of interaction and emulation fraud tends to be fairly stable (pp. 480-481), 
whereas in organisations where there are high levels of interaction and emulation among 
heterogeneous agents fraud dynamics are characterised by extreme behaviours that result in 
an unstable incidence of fraud (pp. 480-481). The idea that there are two types of 
organisations conducive to fraud when there are no rules reinforce the findings of Greve et al. 
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(2010) that all organisations, irrespective of their performance history, are prone to fraud (see 
also Cooper et al., 2013).   
Fraud issues not only include organisational designs that are conducive to fraudulent 
behaviours but also how common practices influence such conduct (Neu et al., 2013). 
Relying on the institutional sociology of Bourdieu, Neu et al. (2013) used data from the 
Canadian government’s sponsorship scandal (1994–2003)3 to demonstrate how the ‘skilful 
use’ of mundane accounting practices and social interactions around these practices facilitate 
fraud. In their analysis, they emphasised that the “involved accounting practices” or the 
habitus of the corporation were an embodied form of capital that depended upon a deep 
understanding of the institutional context and the ability to imagine and use bookkeeping and 
accounting concepts in ways that facilitated corruption (Neu et al., 2013: 520).   
Braithwaite’s (2013) socio-legal analysis of tax compliance and avoidance echoes the 
problems highlighted by Neu et al. (2013). Braithwaite (2013) suggests that most taxpayers 
want an “honest, low fuss’ tax adviser over a game player who aggressively pursues 
loopholes” in markets of virtue (‘goods’) (Braithwaite, 2103: 459; see also Braithwaite, 
2005); however, at the same time Braithwaite argues that there is a demand for aggressive tax 
avoidance schemes in markets of vice (‘bads’) (p. 459). Tax advisors who aggressively put up 
new shelters will use these schemes to entice their clients before the shelters are shut down by 
the relevant authorities (see also Sikka, 2010b; Otusanya, 2011). Braithwaite’s (2013) 
account shows how individuals (tax advisors) and their respective firms comply at levels that 
seem to have economically irrational virtues. Like Neu et al. (2013), Braithwaite’s (2013) 
analysis emphasises the practices used by professionals to bend the rules in favour of their 
clients. Perhaps it is the institutional pressure to maximise profit that forces corporations to 
break the rules (Jackall, 1988; Sikka, 2010a, 2010b; Otusanya, 2011). This practice of 
3
 The Canadian government’s sponsorship scandal (1994-2003)  was a national unification scheme that saw 
approximately $50 million diverted into the bank accounts of political parties, program administrators, and their 
families, friends and business colleagues (see Neu et al., 2013: 505).  
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prioritising profitability rather than ethical conduct becomes institutionalised as individuals 
internalise the values and norms that condone such practices (See Galbraith, 2004; Sikka & 
Hampton, 2005; Sikka, 2008; Braithwaite, 2013; Gabbioneta et al., 2013).  
Fraud is therefore a negotiated construction (Brytting, 2011: 33-34). The acts and 
events that are labelled as fraud (and normality) are decided by actors in positions of 
authority (Galbraith, 2004; see also Williams, 2013). Fraud in corporations is the natural 
order of things; it is the result of an institutionalised structure where actions which are taken 
for granted are assimilated as normal into the corporate culture by certain individuals and 
perpetuated with good intentions, while for others these same actions are implicit and carry 
with them a considerable burden of malice and deception (Galbraith, 2004). Galbraith goes 
on to argue that it is not shareholders or directors that are the leaders of corporation; it is the 
management which is able to set its own incentive system to reward their performance. 
Galbraith's (2004) attestation is worth quoting at length. According to Galbraith,  
[r]eference to corporate management compensation as something set by stockholders or 
their directors is a bogus article of faith.  To affirm this fiction, stockholders are invited 
each year to the annual meeting, which, indeed, resembles a religious rite.  There is 
ceremonial expression and, with rare exception, no negative response.  Infidels who 
urge action are set aside; the management position is routinely approved.  The 
shareholders who previously suggested some social policy or environmental concern 
have their proposals printed with supporting argument.  These are uniformly rejected by 
management… No one should be in doubt: Shareholders – owners – and their alleged 
directors in any sizable enterprise are fully subordinate to the management (Galbraith, 
2004: 34).  
 
Galbraith (2004) argues that these practices by corporate shenanigans become normalised and 
only become fraudulent or illegitimate in retrospect. Thus, Galbraith (2004) highlights what 
he characterises as “innocent fraud”; that is, he draws attention to how negative and harmful 
practices in corporate life can become respectable and even institutionalised (Galbraith, 2004; 
see also Sikka, 2010a; Davis & Pesch, 2013; Gabbioneta et al., 2013). The collapse of Enron, 
other unrelated incidences of corporate fraud (Quest, Tyco International, HealthSouth, 
Parmalat for example), and negligent auditing (Arthur Andersen) all demonstrate how fraud 
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is consumed and regularised by the fraudulent mechanics of a fraudulent system (i.e. modern 
capitalism) (Galbraith, 2004; see also Ashforth & Anand, 2003; Sikka, 2010a). These are all 
painful corroborations of the reality of a state of innocence in which corporate officers used 
to believe themselves to remain, which they never stopped believing until they were 
eventually caught; this is the reason why the fraud is considered innocent (Galbraith, 2004). 
Thus, the notion of responsible governance in modern capitalism may actually nurture 
fraudulent practices (Power, 2013).  
5.2.2. Societal Context and Structural Features that Influence Fraud 
The societal context in which organisational illegality takes place is the outcome of a 
complex systematic process that relies on the interaction between individual, structural and 
environmental factors (Cooper et al., 2013). This sociological view considers fraud to be less 
the result of individual deviance and more the cause of societal pressures (Braithwaite, 1985; 
Coleman, 1985, 1987; Poveda, 1994; Free et al., 2007; Donegan & Ganon, 2008; Mitchell et 
al., 1998). Indeed, as Coleman explains, personalise crime stories that seek out an individual 
villain as a target for public outrage ignore the structural forces (Coleman, 1985: 14-16). As a 
matter of fact, "many organizational crimes cannot be attributed to any single individual, but 
only to the kind of impersonal social forces that the media all but ignore" (p. 16).  
 From conception onwards, an individual's moral and cognitive development is 
strongly influenced by their physical environment and interactions with societal groups and 
institutions that are embedded in the social system (Coleman, 1987).  This interactive 
socialisation process has an impact on the transmission of traits associated with fraudulent 
behaviour (Gabbioneta et al., 2013; Neu et al., 2013). For many, personality traits guide 
behaviour and can have an impact on a person's preferences as they engage with the wider 
social system (Braithwaite, 2013). As individuals become more engaged with the world 
around them, their liberal or conservative ideologies are shaped by the influx of information 
36 
 
that is disseminated through communication media (Cooper et al., 2013). The discourse that 
is disseminated is one that encourages the general public to value monetary success and 
social status over respect for humanity; those that are recognised as having achieved such 
success have their affluent lifestyles splashed across magazines, websites and television 
channels.  
Rarely, however, is the complete story of the successes and failures depicted in such 
non-fiction media; instead, a glossy snapshot of the rags-to-riches story is given and the 
victims of the wrongdoings that took place along the way are ignored or swept under the 
carpet (Messner & Rosenfeld, 1994; Galbraith, 2004; Braithwaite, 2013). In a society that is 
ever-changing and coupled with an increasing reliance upon the internet for information, the 
real stories are starting to take shape and they are not pleasant. The leaders of the future are 
lying, cheating and using manipulation as necessary components of institutional, political and 
social life (Galbraith, 2004; Braithwaite, 2013; Neu et al., 2013). Mottos such as "if you ain't 
cheating, you ain't trying" and "you only live once (YOLO)" are the underpinnings and 
justifications behind such vices (see Murphy & Dacin, 2011; Murphy, 2012). This line of 
discourse views fraud as socially constructed and is considered to be one of those phenomena 
which are particularly sensitive to and symptomatic of a more pervasive and generalisable 
characteristic within a wider social, economic, legal and political framework (see 
Braithwaite, 2013; Cooper et al., 2013). An individual’s behaviour is embedded within 
organisational contexts where actions “are shaped by social influence processes – such as 
norms of reciprocity, social comparison, and dissonance reduction – by which individuals 
might be drawn into and then become caught within a flow of wrongdoing” (Gabbioneta et 
al., 2013: 486). 
 In searching for explanation of the correlates of wrongdoing, consideration must be 
given to the wider societal context and how it shapes a person's intellectual and moral 
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development (Coleman, 1987); from this perspective, crime is learned and becomes routine 
(Ashforth & Anand, 2003; Galbraith, 2004; Murphy & Dacin, 2011; Murphy, 2012). The 
challenge is to unpack the politics of this learning to gain insights into how the text of fraud 
discourse is constructed, produced, consumed and regularised.  
6.  Applying the CDA Analytical Framework 
6.1. CDA and the (De)construction of Pressure to Commit Fraud 
 
6.1.1. Level of Analysis: Text 
 
The perceived need for money as articulated by Cressey (1953) may well be a 
necessary ingredient for fraud to occur (Choo & Tan, 2007; Brytting et al., 2010). Even 
though Wells, the founder of the ACFE, acknowledged the notion of non-sharable financial 
problems in his reconstruction of Cressey’s (1953) work, he replaced it with the notion of 
‘pressure’ (Wells, 1997: 11). Furthermore, inspired by the fraud triangle, the professional 
accounting bodies (AICPA, 2002, paragraph 31, p. 16; see also IFAC, 2006, paragraph 24, 
section A25, p. 174) have extended the chain of translation with the notion of 
“incentive/pressure” (Morales et al., 2014: 182). As in Wells’ (1997) work, the non-shareable 
financial problem has disappeared and been replaced with an “incentive” or “pressure” to 
commit fraud (p. 182).  
The redefinition of Cressey’s (1953) "non-sharable financial pressure" allows for an 
understanding of the deformation mechanisms at work in reformulating  the concept as it is 
understood in criminology and redeployed in the fraud and auditing community (Morales et 
al., 2014: 182). A focus on this redefinition can offer a strategic approach that allows analysts 
to deconstruct the ideological discourse that has come to represent the incentive/pressure 
element of the fraud triangle. The substantive translation misses a central aspect of Cressey’s 
(1953) thesis whereby a “sequence of events” is present when a violation occurs and is absent 
when there is no violation (Cressey, 1953: 12). Thus, it endorses the notion that individuals 
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who are subject to incentives or situational pressures will commit fraud (Morales et al., 2014: 
182). Replacing the concept of Cressey's (1953) non-sharable financial problem with the 
ACFE and AICPA's construction of ‘incentive and pressure’ means that the identification of 
factors that may have led the individual to commit fraud is pushed even further into the 
background (Morales et al., 2013: 182). The notion that the management and/or employees 
have an incentive or are under pressure is based on the assumption that they have “a reason to 
commit fraud” (AICPA, 2002, paragraph 7, p. 8, as cited in Morales et al., 2013: 182), for 
example the pressure faced by management bodies to manipulate their financial targets in 
order to meet Wall Street’s expectations (see Greve et al., 2010).  
 
6.1.2. Level of Analysis: Discourse Practice 
 
At the discursive practice level, each of these choices (incentive and pressure) allows 
the ACFE and by extension the anti-fraud establishment to set up the basic shape of an 
enterprise through which their choices of fraud discourse are represented. It allows them to 
foreground a meaning that privileges an explanation based on the incentive/pressure to 
commit fraud and background other possible causes. This meaning was contextualised by the 
anti-fraud community to pigeonhole fraud in the realm of the specific; individuals commit 
fraud in conditions involving sufficient incentives and pressures (AICPA, 2002, paragraph 
31, p. 16; Power, 2013: 526). The area of interest in this individualised discourse is that 
"personal incentives and perceived pressure drive human behavior" (Ramamoorti, 2008:  
525), while the area of salience is that judgment is readily passed on moral deviants who 
succumb to financial pressures without looking at the structural variables and macro-level 
features that have shaped their behaviour (Morales et al., 2014: 178; see also Lynch et al., 
2004; Free et al., 2007;  Donegan & Ganon, 2008; Cooper et al., 2013).  
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6.1.3. Level of Analysis: Sociocultural Practice 
 
With regards to sociocultural practice, it is important to note that at the institutional 
level the ACFE as authorities of the discourse and its support cast of professional auditing 
groups have foregrounded certain features and suppressed others in their translation of "non-
shareable financial pressure" (Cressey, 1953). They decide what to include and what to 
exclude from the discourse; how the discourse is represented in the anti-fraud community; 
how the construct of "pressure" is conceptualised; and where boundaries are placed in this 
conceptualisation. The point is that the meaning of ‘incentive/pressure’ is not governed by 
objective criteria, but rather by the structural conventions necessary to promote a specific 
vision in which certain types of behaviour are classified as the incentive/pressure to commit 
fraud and are endorsed and promulgated as one of the prerequisites of the fraud triangle 
(Peecher, 1996; Hogan et al., 2008; Murphy, 2012). Indeed for some, the need to act 
fraudulently may arise from incentives/pressure; for others however, fraudulent behaviour 
could simply be dependent upon a range of macro-level factors not accounted for by the 
ACFE's discourse (Fitzsimons, 2009; Murdock, 2008; Rae & Subramaniam, 2008).  
6.1.4. The Reconceptualised Pressure Leg Applied 
To analyse how text and the discursive processes that have come to represent the 
“pressure” to commit fraud are restricted in their explanation across contexts, returning to the 
cases involving Coughlin and London may be valuable. Coughlin was an icon, at one time 
was the Vice-Chairman – the second highest rank executive – and he was a candidate to 
become the CEO. He worked at Walmart for 25 years, five of them as the second most 
powerful executive within the Company. What makes this case even more interesting is that 
in the year immediately prior to his resignation, Coughlin’s compensation topped $6 million 
(Bandler & Zimmerman, 2005: para. 6). Stealing items “worth just a fraction of the millions 
of dollars he earned in salary, bonuses and stock options” seems rather petty for a man of 
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Coughlin’s means (Associated Press, 2006: para. 4); indeed, risking $6 million in annual 
compensation for a $500,000 payoff along with the reputational damage that comes with 
getting caught does seem rather irrational (see also Dorminey et al., 2010: 20). 
  Likewise, in the insider trading case involving London at KPMG, the fraud triangle’s 
component of pressure was by far the least possible motive for committing the fraud. After 
his plea, in a webcast on ethics for the AICPA, London was quick to admit that he “didn’t do 
it for money” and further reasoned that the money he accepted “was not material to [his] 
income level” (Pfeifer, 2013: para. 7-8). Nevertheless, the risks taken by London are evident 
in other cases of millionaire CEOs and partners perpetuating corporate fraud (pp. 20-21).  
The conduct exhibited by Coughlin and London are inconsistent with the discourse 
disseminated by the ACFE and the AICPA in the pressure leg of the fraud triangle. The 
perceived need for money is no doubt a necessary requirement for fraud; however, as is 
evident from both Coughlin and London's circumstances, pressure has proven to be an 
incomplete descriptor of their motivations to offend and is not representative of every 
occurrence of fraud (see Dorminey et al., 2010: 18). In other words, the analysis of textual 
features in relation to how the larger discourse on “pressure” is disseminated and consumed is 
dependent upon the sociocultural practices that nurtured its existence. The micro-analysis of 
“pressure” and the manner in which its meaning is reproduced and recontextualised reflects 
the preoccupation with a recursive analytic movement that legitimises dominance and 
hegemony, which enables its operationalisation to suit a particular sociocultural context (see 
Luke, 2002: 100).  
6.2. CDA and the (De)construction of Opportunity  to Commit Fraud 
 
6.2.1. Level of Analysis: Text  
 
Cressey’s (1953:17) assertion that financial problems can be resolved by the violation 
of a “position of trust” (perceived opportunity) is replaced with the term “opportunity” by 
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anti-fraud professionals (ACFE) and standard setters (AICPA and IFAC) (Morales et al., 
2014). In contrast to Cressey (1953), this reconceptualisation is central to the construction of 
a dominant discourse around "opportunity", the dimensions of which revolve around deficient 
internal controls (Davis & Pesch; 2013: Power, 2013; Williams, 2013). The focus is on the 
individual acting alone. The individual fraudster becomes the unit of analysis and his or her 
corresponding preoccupation with monetary success provides the incentive to circumvent 
internal controls.  
The choice of words (whether in spoken or written text) can signify different 
meanings or establish certain terrain that authoritative bodies want to position their audience 
to follow (Fairclough, 1992, 1995, 2003; see also Fairclough & Wodak, 1997; Chouliaraki & 
Fairclough, 2010). The terrain will signify the focus of a particular course of action, which 
may need to be made explicit. For example, if a text uses "perceived opportunity" rather than 
"opportunity", one immediately gets a sense of the direction that is being laid out. It is much 
easier to build a fraud prevention mechanism that focuses on the “opportunity" to commit 
fraud rather than the much more interpretative "perceived opportunity". For Cressey, 
"perceive opportunity" focuses on the individual’s perception of acting with intent; that is, the 
individual must necessarily perceive the possibility to perpetuate a crime (Cressey, 1973, pp. 
xii-xiii). Through this lens, internal controls to eliminate the opportunity for fraud are less 
important than individual perceptions; rather, according to Cressey (1973), one should 
assume that "objective opportunities" for fraud always exist (Morales et al., 2014: 175). The 
term "opportunity" as it is constructed by the fraud triangle is interpreted to mean "that any 
apparently ‘ordinary’ individual can commit fraud, and subsequently, promulgate a discourse 
that privileges organizational controls to eliminate the opportunity to commit fraud” (Morales 
et al., 2014: 186; Power, 2013: 529).   
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 6.2.2. Level of Analysis: Discourse Practice 
 
A common rhetorical strategy in this discursive practice is the association between 
opportunity and fraud. Here, the purveyors of the discourse frame opportunity as the only 
element of fraud risk that employers can influence (Jans, Lybaert, & Vanhoof, 2010; Power, 
2013; Williams, 2013). The emphasis is on the need for internal controls: since an employee 
is in a position of trust (i.e., no one is checking), internal controls can be violated (Morales et 
al., 2014: 178; see also Messina, 1997; Buckhoff, 2001; Brytting et al., 2011). Fraud demands 
the individual’s ability and knowledge to circumvent internal controls without the possibility 
of getting caught (Neu et al., 2013; Power, 2013). As a result, discussions in accounting and 
auditing research have tended to focus upon the reproduction of dominance around the theme 
of internal controls for the prevention and detection of fraud (Messina, 1997; Buckhoff, 2001; 
Albrecht et al., 2004; Alleyne & Howard, 2005; CIMA, 2008; Rae & Subramaniam, 2008; 
Fleak et al., 2010; Kelley & Hartley, 2010; Strand Norman et al., 2010; Cooper et al., 2013; 
Power, 2013; Morales et al., 2014). As the following excerpts show, discourses on 
"opportunity" and "internal controls” appear in a variety of research efforts; however, they 
reproduce the same content, promote a similar branch of knowledge, support the same 
strategy and belong to the same discursive formulation:    
 
In sum, an individual who is able to rationalize personal gain at the expense of 
others is likely to commit fraud when incentive and opportunity exist (Wilks & 
Zimbelman, 2010: 725).  
 
Even if there is an assumption “that management integrity could be 
compromised, given the right incentive and opportunity, then the risk of fraud 
increases significantly” (Srivastava, Mock, & Turner: 2003: 29).  
 
Professional accounting bodies have been much more profound in their interpretation of 
opportunity: 
 
In terms of opportunity, fraud is more likely in companies where there is a 
weak internal control system, poor security over company property, little fear 
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of exposure and likelihood of detection, or unclear policies with regard to 
acceptable behaviour. Research has shown that some employees are totally 
honest, some are totally dishonest, but that many are swayed by opportunity 
(CIMA, 2008: 13). 
 
Consequently,  
 
[o]ne of the most effective ways to tackle the problem of fraud is to adopt 
methods that will decrease motive or opportunity, or preferably both 
rationalisation is personal to the individual and more difficult to combat, 
although ensuring that the company has a strong ethical culture and clear 
values should help (CIMA, 2008: 14). 
 
The centrality of this discourse to the reproduction of knowledge shows how meanings are 
ascribed to "opportunity" and how this meaning is institutionalised, interpreted and 
transmitted by the wider anti-fraud community, which views fraud as an individual problem 
to be thwarted by effective internal controls (Peterson & Gibson, 2003; Albrecht, Albrecht, & 
Albrecht, 2004; Alleyne & Howard, 2005; Rae & Subramaniam, 2008; Kelly & Hartley, 
2010; Jans et al., 2010; Strand Norman et al., 2010).  
 
6.3.3. Level of Analysis: Sociocultural Practice 
 
At the sociocultural practice level of CDA, the discourse on the opportunity to 
commit fraud implies a dialectical relationship between the message (i.e., the discursive 
event) being disseminated and the manner in which institutions (i.e., anti-fraud organisations) 
have framed it. The systematic exploration between discourse practice and sociocultural 
practice exposes the distortion of anti-fraud discourse on internal controls as a mechanism to 
curb fraud risks in organisations (see Power, 2013; Davis & Pesch, 2013). Fraud is analysed 
through the lens of an individual’s behaviour and does not provide a solid theoretical base for 
assessing the likelihood of fraud under conditions of collusion (Coleman, 1985; Benson & 
Simpson, 209; Colvin et al., 2002; Berger, 2011). Internal controls are not possible in a 
collusive environments as the system may still be circumvented by corporate executives and 
auditors working together to perpetrate fraud (Ashforth & Anand, 2003; Free et al., 2007; 
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Benson & Simpson, 2009; Stuebs & Wilkinson, 2010; Free & Murphy, 2013; Neu, Everett, & 
Rahaman, 2013; Power, 2013; Lokanan, 2014).4 The greatest risk as we have repeatedly seen 
from the recent accounting scandals comes from those in a position of  authority who 
conspire with others to commit fraudulent acts that can cripple entire economies (Dedoulis, 
2006; Sikka, 2010a; Gabbioneta et al., 2013; Neu et al., 2013; Power, 2013).  
6.4.4. The Reconceptualised Opportunity Leg Applied  
To illustrate how the discourse on the “opportunity” to commit fraud is constructed to 
privilege a particular situational context at the exclusion of others, let’s revisit the Lehman 
case.5 In this case, the main players were the executives, Lehman's accountants and the 
Company’s auditors, Ernst & Young (“E&Y”). The bankruptcy examiner of the Lehman 
Brothers Case Anton Valukas (2010) was critical of E&Y’s part in the collapse; according to 
Valukas (2010), E&Y took no steps to question the non-disclosure by Lehman’s executives 
of the $50 billion, off-balance sheet transactions that flattered the bank’s financial position. 
Rather, it seems that E&Y was encouraging participants to present Lehman’s low leverage as 
positive news to investors (Jeffers, 2011). Together, E&Y colluded with Lehman’s executives 
and in-house accountants to take advantage of accounting rules in order to present a 
favourable financial statement to stakeholders (Valukas, 2010). The misleading portrayal of 
Lehman’s true financial health appears to have been perpetrated through the actions of 
individuals working together either within the organisation or across organisations, as 
opposed to being the actions of a single misguided individual (see Ashforth & Anand, 2003: 
2). Fraudulent practices were disseminated throughout Lehman via an institutional process 
that allowed such practices to prosper (Gabbioneta et al., 2013). E&Y was co-opted by 
4
 The concentration is more profound with respect to the segregation of duties, which has garnered close 
scrutiny since the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act section 404 requirements (Dorminey et al., 2010: 19).  
5
 Another example of collusive behaviour is the Freddie Mac (2003) fraud case. The main players in the Freddie 
Mac scandal were the President, CFO, and Sr. VPs. An SEC investigation found that they collaborated to 
fraudulently mis-state earnings (mostly underreported) over a four-year period in order to smooth volatility in 
earnings and meet Wall Street targets (SEC v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, 2007). 
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Lehman’s executives and a tacit agreement was fostered to turn a blind eye to fraudulent 
practices (see also Ashforth & Anand, 2003: 11). This secret cooperation amongst individuals 
became more difficult to detect when one of the gatekeepers (in this case E&Y) responsible 
for monitoring such behaviour became part of the problem (Coleman, 1985).  
Come to think of it, it may be rather naïve to picture “opportunity” as something 
Lehman’s executives recently discovered and were seduced by to commit fraud (Brytting et 
al., 2011: 52). Rather, as the evidence suggests, fraud is less the result of solo-offending and 
more the result of collusion between senior managers and their vastly experienced inner 
circle of accountants and information technology experts (see also Coleman, 1985; Mitchell 
et al., 1998; Free et al., 2007; Donegan & Ganon, 2008; Morales et al., 2014; Lokanan, 
2014). The fraud is usually perpetrated by these individuals who cleverly camouflage and 
manipulate internal controls to carry out the fraudulent act (Mitchell et al., 1998; Free et al., 
2007; Lokanan, 2014). It takes specialised knowledge to commit fraud, and to some extent it 
may seem as if the organisation’s control system has been consciously re-designed into an 
opportunity for fraud (Brytting et al., 2011: 52). Accordingly, it is not always opportunity that 
leads to fraud and it could be the other way around, with the fraudsters creating the 
opportunity to commit the fraud (p. 52). The fraud triangle’s inability to explain the more 
collusive corporate frauds therefore presents a parsimonious discourse of offending (Free & 
Murphy, 2013: 30). The collusion to commit fraud amongst individuals within the 
organisation, as well as across organisations, does not appear to fit the fraud triangle’s 
framework.  
6.3. CDA and the (De)construction of Rationalisation  to Commit Fraud 
 
6.3.1. Level of Analysis: Text 
 
In his related concept of “verbalization”, Cressey (1953) found that the internal 
conversation that the perpetrator has with himself in order to rationalise his behaviour can 
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serve as motivation to remove guilt (Cressey, 1953: 30; see also Murphy & Dacin, 2011: 
Murphy, 2012). The striking feature of Cressey's (1953) work is that  
 
embezzlers tend to rationalize their behavior in ways that imply that deep down, they 
are honest. Specifically, Cressey contends that, before committing a violation, the 
person convinces himself that the act will not compromise his identity as an honest 
person and that it conforms to a certain ethical view of himself (Morales et al., 2014: 
176).  
 
In fact, rationalisation is seen as  
part of the motivation of the crime. Because the fraudster does not view himself as a 
criminal, he must justify his misdeed before he ever commits them.  The rationalization 
is necessary so that the perpetrator can make his illegal behaviour intelligible to him 
and maintain the concept of himself as a trusted person (Krancher et al., 2010:  66).  
 
The “verbalisation”, or the words and phrases that embezzlers used to rationalise their actions 
(and inaction), was the more important element that got them into trouble (Cressey, 1953: 
111).   
A modified discourse to understand rationalisation has been constructed by the anti-
fraud establishment. The discourse has redefined "rationalisation" to meet certain objectives, 
namely to see it as a part of human nature (Morales et al., 2014:  17). This redefinition of 
‘rationalisation’ is central to the production and reproduction of knowledge around the 
concept and is represented by the following text from Wells: “once the line is crossed, the 
illegal acts become more or less continuous” (Wells, 1997: 17). The message being endorsed 
with this discourse is to associate rationalisation with attitude, which shifts the unit of 
analysis closer to deficit in relation to the individual's morality (Morales et al., 2014).  This 
permutation, promoted in the work of the AICPA, seems to assume that "some individuals 
possess an attitude, character, or set of ethical values that allow them to knowingly and 
intentionally commit a dishonest act” (AICPA, 2002, paragraph 7, p. 8). Here, rationalisation 
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is being placed in the background by an attitudinal stance that endorses deficiencies in the 
morality of individuals as the reason for committing fraud (Morales et al., 2014: 182).   
 
6.3.2. Level of Analysis: Discourse Practice 
The ACFE’s deconstruction of the term “rationalisation” and its alignment with 
dishonesty and a lack of integrity (or personal ethics) has led to increased research on the 
individual psychology of the fraudster (Buckhoff, 2001; Albrecht et al., 2004; Dedoulis, 
2006; Choo & Tan, 2008; Murdock, 2008; Rae & Subramaniam, 2008;  Brazel et al., 2009; 
Albrecht et al., 2010; Cohen et al., 2010; Murphy & Dacin, 2011). The majority of attention 
seems to have been placed on language that standard setters have defined as the dominant 
logic of rationalisation. Such language has led to the solidification of a particular branch of 
knowledge that associates fraud with certain hapless souls (usually a first-time offender) with 
a good reputation in the community and is centred around perceiving the individual as an 
"accidental fraudster" (Krancher et al., 2010; see also Buckhoff, 2001; Albrecht et al., 2004; 
Rae & Subramaniam, 2008).   
These discursive formulations are theoretically justified using Cressey’s (1953) work 
by systematically deconstructing the concept of rationalisation and replacing it with an 
ideology that stresses dishonesty, or by associating it with a lack of integrity or dubious ethics 
to rationalise a fraudulent act (Morales et al., 2014: 186; see also Buckhoff, 2001; Albrecht et 
al., 2004; Rae & Subramaniam, 2008; Srivastava, Mock, & Turner, 2009). The sustained 
effect of this discourse has steered prevention efforts and encouraged auditors to assess the 
individual morality of the fraudster:  
 
 Regulators should place greater consideration on ethics in the officially 
promulgated auditing standards in order to enhance the ability of auditors to be 
more effective in detecting corporate fraud (Cohen et al., 2010:  272).   
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[Auditors should] understand the financial reporting environment (for example, 
attitudes, ethics, motives, and pressures) affecting the CEO, CFO, and others who 
are involved in the entity’s financial reporting (AICPA, 2005: 5). 
 
 
Auditors can become familiar with the rationalization categories and design 
interview techniques to identify them. An identified rationalization serves as a 
psychological red flag to the presence of fraud (Murphy & Dacin: 2011: 615). 
 
The masked academic discourse on the demand for auditors to assess the integrity and ethical 
values of their clients has strengthened and reinforced the rhetoric that an understanding of 
the individual’s morality will perhaps have more impact in terms of preventing a potential 
fraudster from committing fraud (see Cooper et al., 2013: 443-444).   
6.3.3 Level of Analysis: Sociocultural Practice 
The institutional marketisation of rationalisation as it is presented in the fraud triangle 
is socio-politically “situated” to align with the fraudster’s justification to commit fraud. It 
then follows that an analytical enterprise is constructed that facilitates a discursive practice 
that aligns rationalisation with a lack of integrity and morality as the key offending traits of 
the fraudster (Morales et al., 2014: 182). There are, however, fundamental problems with 
these constructions. First, the rationalisation leg as defined by Cressey (1953) and 
reformulated by the ACFE is not directly observable because it is impossible to know exactly 
what the individual may be thinking (Dorminey et al., 2010; Murphy & Dacin, 2011; Morales 
et al., 2014). Second, the sociocultural practice and the operationalisation of “rationalisation” 
does not apply to pathological fraudsters who, by the very nature of their personalities, have 
no morals or need to rationalise their behaviour (Albrecht et al., 2004; Dorminey et al., 2010; 
Murphy, 2012). The grandiose sense of self of these individuals means, more often than not, 
that they have no conscience, or alternatively, as we have seen in the London case, they do 
not see their actions as being wrong (Bakan, 2004; Stout, 2005; Dorminey et al., 2012).  
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Pathological fraudsters possess an exceptional ability to rationalise their behaviours 
(Brytting et al., 2011: 53). Whatever action they take can be justified in their minds which, 
when combined with their ability to rationalise fraudulent acts, can lead to fraud even when 
the pressure and opportunity factors are slight (p. 53). The actions of predatory fraudsters are 
more deliberate, cause larger losses and are harder to detect, making them more dangerous 
than the accidental fraudster (Dorminey et al., 2010: 18-19). When one factors these 
personality traits into the equation, it appears that the fraud triangle was created with 
accidental fraudsters in mind, which is sustained by coexisting discursive practices by anti-
fraud establishments. By virtue of being better organised, all the pathological fraudster needs 
is an opportunity; s/he does not need any pressure or rationalisation to circumvent the law 
(Howe & Malgwi, 2006: 28-29; Albrecht et al., 2010: 263-265; Krancher et al., 2010: 22).  
6.4.4. The Reconceptualised Rationalisation Leg Applied 
The discourse on the “rationalisation” to commit fraud is privileged to stabilise a 
construction of fraud that distances itself from Cressey's (1953) conceptualisation. To fully 
understand the consequences and implication of this construction, it is best to revisit the 
insider trading scandal involving London. When one takes a closer look at the charges 
levelled against London and then tries to use the rationalisation leg of the fraud triangle to 
explain his actions, it seems impossible to piece them together (see also Dorminey et al., 
2010; Murphy & Dacin, 2011). Now, if London had bought a new $3 or $4 million mansion 
when the market was at its peak, one could have rationalised that he may have needed the 
extra cash to finance his home. But from all published reports, the $3 million home would 
only be worth two or three times his annual compensation bonus. Moreover, London was still 
alleged to be living in the Southern Californian home that he had bought before the time he 
was promoted to partner, which puts the value of his house at about one-third of his annual 
compensation. Even London’s lawyer later pointed out that there was no money trouble.  
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Based on the news reports and the calibre of journalists who worked on the story, there were 
no drugs or girlfriend involved, and also no family problems. So how could a regional audit 
partner of one of the most prestigious auditing firms possibly develop a 
rationalisation/justification for the alleged insider trading that took place?   
Perhaps the justification can be found in Murphy and Dacin’s (2011) work on the 
psychological pathways of fraud. According to Murphy and Dacin (2011),   
 
individuals are motivated to see themselves in a positive light. If an individual commits 
fraud, then s/he is motivated to improve self-image in some other way. [Self-
affirmation] theory asserts that an individual could admit wrongful behaviour if s/he 
affirmed another equally valuable part of the self (p. 610). 
 
From this theoretical position, rationalisation takes on a different meaning distinct from 
the fraud triangle’s conceptualisation (see also Free et al., 2007; Morales et al., 2014). A 
fraudster may try to help those in need if helping the needy is important to him or her. In 
London's case, he rationalised his actions by acknowledging that he “did it to help out 
someone whose business was struggling. It was a bad, bad mistake” (Pfeifer, 2013: para. 
7). Here London is involved in self-affirmation where he is cleansing his conscience and 
changing his attitude to morally justify his reprehensible behaviour as appearing worthy of 
a higher purpose (see Murphy & Dacin, 2011: 610). Even though some may construe 
London’s rationalisation as having merit, it does not change the fact that he was a willing 
participant in passing material including non-public information about the securities of 
companies he audited in exchange for cash and gifts. London construed a fraudulent 
situation and then placed the responsibility for his actions elsewhere (see Murphy, 2012: 
244).   
Evidently, there are incidences of fraud where the rationalisation leg, as defined by 
the fraud triangle, may not be applicable at all (Albrecht et al., 2010; Jones, 2010; 
Murphy& Dacin, 2011). In this alternative discourse, in contrast to the ‘normal’ and 
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accepted characteristics of the construct, the fraudster's behaviour is associated with a 
neurotic personality (Stout, 2005; Dorminey et al., 2010; Murphy, 2102; Ramamoorti, 
2008; Kelly & Hartley, 2010). This discourse reversal has unveiled a "pathological 
fraudster" (AKA predator) who feels no guilt for his or her actions (Stout, 2005; Dorminey 
et al., 2010); the predator is seen as a serial offender who actively seeks out internal 
control weaknesses that he or she is able to take advantage of (Dorminey et al., 2010).   
Table 1-2 sums up the shortcomings of the fraud triangle. The fraud triangle is not 
a general theory of crime and cannot explain all occurrences of fraud. The non-sharable 
financial pressure to which Cressey (1953) referred is an incomplete descriptor and does 
not account for the various types of pressures that lead to fraud. Perceived opportunity 
does not address collusive behaviour and management overrides. The rationalisation to 
commit the fraud is a non-observable trait. Some fraudsters do not need rationalisation to 
commit fraud; all that is required is a perceived opportunity where the probability of 
committing the act and getting caught is low. There is no need for pressure or 
rationalisation.  
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Table 1-2: Table Showing the Shortcomings of the Fraud Triangle6 
Definition Shortcomings Explanation of Shortcomings 
The Fraud Triangle  
The convergence of 
incentive/ pressure, 
opportunity, and 
rationalisation will lead to 
fraud. 
The fraud triangle is not a 
general theory of crime and 
cannot explain every 
occurrence of fraud (see 
Hirschi & Gottfredson, 
1989). 
1. Pressure, opportunity, and 
rationalisation do not need to 
converge and be present in 
all fraudulent acts. 
2. The fraud triangle does not 
adequately address the 
predatory fraudster and those 
that are better organised.  
Perceive Pressure 
Non-shareable financial 
need. 
Non-shareable financial 
pressure is an incomplete 
descriptor of the fraudster’s 
motivation (see Dorminey et 
al., 2010). 
The pressure to commit the 
fraud does not need to be 
non-sharable and financial.  
Opportunity 
The presence of opportunity 
to commit the fraudulent act. 
 
Opportunity does not address 
collusive behaviour and 
management overrides (see 
Alleyne & Howard, 2005;   
Dorminey et al., 2010; 
Lokanan, 2014). 
Opportunity does not take 
into consideration criminal 
cooperation, i.e., the process 
in which individuals pool 
their expertise to commit 
fraud.  
Rationalisation 
Morally justifiable reasons to 
act.  
1. Rationalisation is not 
observable (see Murphy, 
2012).  
2. Some fraudster does not 
need rationalisation to 
commit fraud (see Murphy & 
Dacin, 2011). 
1. Rationalisation cannot be 
quantified and measured.   
2. The predatory fraudster 
does not need to rationalise 
her/his action; all s/he needs 
is an opportunity to act.  
 
7.  Some Concluding Thoughts   
 
In this paper, I have employed a CDA framework to analyse the fraud discourse 
disseminated by the ACFE more systematically and more critically from a linguistic 
perspective (see also Cortese et al., 2010; Merkl-Davies & Koller, 2012). By linking the 
content and linguistic features of the fraud triangle discourse to the specific context of text 
production and the wider anti-fraud community, I have been able to show that the ACFE and 
its alliance of anti-fraud associations uses semiotic devices to strategically achieve their goals 
6
 See also Dorminey et al.’s (2010) work for an extension of the fraud triangle model.  
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(Merkl-Davies & Koller, 2012; Morales et al., 2014 ). A CDA’s framing reveals that this 
discourse is part of a contested terrain where language is used as a weapon to facilitate the 
interest of professional associations, and more importantly solidify the significance of their 
relationships with each other (Morales et al., 2014; Cortese et al., 2010). Perhaps more 
importantly, a critical discourse of analysis has exposed the “interactive process of meaning-
making” within the language used to conceptualise fraud and its antecedents’ prevention 
strategies that would not have been possible without employing CDA (Fairclough, 2003: 10). 
Contextually, a CDA’s framing has allowed me to challenge the research efforts 
involving the fraud triangle, which have associated corporate illegality with the prerequisite 
antecedents of pressure, opportunity and rationalisation (Gabbioneta et al., 2013; Morales et 
al., 2014). While these three elements may prove insightful in understanding why the 
situational fraudster chooses to offend, a CDA shows that they draw attention away from 
other issues and processes that may be associated with fraud (Cooper et al., 2013: 444; 
Gabbioneta et al., 2013: 493). More specifically, the individual focus on the decision-making 
model downplays the strand of criminology that views crime from a macro-sociological angle 
(Morales et al., 2014: 173; see also Donegan & Ganon, 2008; Cooper et al., 2013). The 
ACFE's endorsement of fraud as an individualised problem rather than a socio-political issue 
raises three concerns that are related to the fraud triangle concepts. First, the endorsement of 
a flawed model has led individuals to believe that they can continue their actions without 
getting caught, amplifying their motivation to cheat. Second, the heavy reliance on the 
ACFE's limited conception of fraud and the focus on the fraud triangle and its antecedent’s 
concepts (Brody et al., 2012) has established opportunities for concealment, enabling 
individuals and organisations to successfully plan and execute fraud. Third, concealment of 
fraud has been aided and abetted by an identifiable discourse that has linked rationalisation to 
attitude, in the process aligning fraudulent behaviour with the individual's personality and 
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frail morality (AICPA, 2002:  8). Taken together, the discourse associated with these 
concerns suggests that fraud risk factors are grouped into the legs of the fraud triangle around 
“conditions that indicate incentives/pressures to perpetrate fraud, opportunities to carry out 
the fraud, or attitudes/rationalizations to justify a fraudulent action” (AICPA, 2002, paragraph 
31, p. 16; see also IFAC, 2006, paragraph 24, section A25, p. 174).  
 By advocating the fraud triangle therefore, it can be argued that the ACFE and 
AICPA have divorced their understanding of corporate criminals from an understanding of 
corporate fraud. The fraud triangle tends to explain why some decent and trustworthy 
individuals (i.e., the accidental fraudster) make bad choices, and may be able to explain low-
level, occupational frauds with some degree of certainty (Ramamoorti et al., 2009). To 
facilitate this rhetoric, the fraud triangle is openly endorsed as a tool by its framers to 
promote a branch of knowledge around fraud prevention and individual deviant morality (see 
Cooper et al., 2013; Morales et al., 2013). This branch of knowledge is important in 
maintaining and reproducing the fraud triangle as a practitioner framework that promotes "the 
evaluation, monitoring and normalization of the character of organizational members" 
(Morales et al., 2014: 171). Such discourse is a complex and multi-level one that privileges 
the perception that fraud is rooted in the individual's frail morality, while turning a blind eye 
to the social process through which individuals’ behaviours are influenced (Davis & Pesch, 
2013: 470).  To sum up, the fraud triangle does go some way in explaining why corporate 
executives and their inner circle of accountants, lawyers, and information technology experts 
are associated with fraud. However, there is a danger that the individualized focus of this 
decision-making model will distract attention from other decision-making approaches and 
issues related to fraud (Cooper et al, 2013: 444; also see Donegan & Ganon, 2008;  Dorminey 
et al., 2010; Cooper et al., 2013;  Gabbioneta et al., 2013; Morales et al., 2014).   
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Going forward, it is important that anti-fraud research recognises that predators do 
exist and provide professionals with the requisite skills for detecting the distinguishing 
characteristics for exposing the predatory fraudster (Dorminey et al., 2012). To assist in this 
cause, "a stronger understanding of the role of culture and institution in promotion, 
persistence and prevention of fraud would enable [anti-fraud professionals] to address some 
of the more systemic issues on a macro-level" (Cooper et al., 2013: 452). In the sociology and 
criminology literature on white-collar crime, there is a long standing concern to locate 
wrongdoing within wider societal influences (Hirschi, 1969; Braithwaite, 1985; Coleman, 
1985; Hirschi & Gottfredson, 1989; Colvin et al., 2002; Wikström & Treiber, 2007).  This 
social science understanding “starts from a position that morality and fraud are neither 
personal nor universal, but are situated in specific social and historical contexts" (Cooper et 
al., 2013; 445). Fraud is multifaceted and is a reflection of the perpetrator’s surrounding 
habitat. As such, a consideration of the wider macro social and economic dimensions are all 
critical for gaining an understanding of the unethical behaviour that could eventually lead to 
fraud (Coleman, 1985; Donegan  & Ganon, 2008; Misangyi, Weaver, & Elms, 2008; Cohen 
et al., 2010; Cooper et al., 2013; Gabbioneta et al., 2013; Morales et al., 2014). This 
integrated approach "highlights the value of a more situated view of how fraud takes place" 
(Cooper et al., 2013: 451), and provides additional insights on its socio-political origins 
(Morales, et al., 2014; Davis & Pesch, 2014).  
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